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*April 1877.*

**THE CAUSATIONAL AND FREE WILL  
THEORIES OF VOLITION:**

*1877*

BEING A REVIEW OF  
**DR. CARPENTER'S "MENTAL PHYSIOLOGY."**

BY  
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1877.

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BEING A REVIEW OF DR. CARPENTER'S "MENTAL  
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## INTRODUCTION.

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BEING attracted some time ago by the title of a book,—*Mental Physiology*, by Dr. W. B. Carpenter—and considering that the title indicated a peculiar treatment of mental phenomena, I bought it; the more readily as the author's name is widely known as one of deserved eminence in the scientific world.

I thought the position indicated by the title a good one, and that the book would afford instructive and interesting reading; anticipations fulfilled to the utmost, not only on account of the stores of information contained in it, but also because one of its principal objects turned out to be the demarcation of the realm of Law in human action, and the realm of Free Will.

That the Causational Theory and the Theory of Free Will are both true appeared to me clear, although the advocates of the former (principally men of science) always seemed to make man too much like a machine; while the advocates of the latter (principally theologians) used language incapable of being represented in thought, and therefore unintelligible. Now, I thought, when we have a man like Dr. Carpenter treating the subject impartially on both sides, we are getting on the right track. But the more I studied his Work, the more I became convinced that Dr. Carpenter had failed in the task he had set himself, and I embodied my criticisms in an Essay read before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, April, 1877.

Having further pursued the study, by the perusal of other authors, the reading has had a tendency to sink Dr. Carpenter's Work, in this particular respect, to a rather subordinate position; but as it is one which, more than any other Work known to me, expresses popular and general views, and in which the juxtaposition of the two great bodies of opinion is most fully and fairly presented, I have thought it expedient in this Essay to retain the same title and method of treating the subject.

As some severe criticism will be found in the following pages, I take the opportunity to express here not only my admiration of

Dr. Carpenter's book in general, but my entire concurrence with what I conceive to be its special aim—viz., the vindication of the power of Self-rule.

The existence of such a power has been contended for by the great moral teachers of all ages; is a fact within the consciousness of most of us, however explained; and its cultivation to a higher degree is held to be within the means of almost every man; the attainment of it, as a commanding force, being regarded as a noble possession.

The opinions I have formed are expressed with more or less clearness in various books that I have read, though not grouped together for mutual support in the form in which I think they should be co-ordinated. This is my main reason for printing this Essay, together with the desire to assist in doing away with that obscurely fatalistic feeling that results to many from too much dwelling upon the sequences of Causation; a feeling as if the stamina of their moral constitution had departed, and as if they had been deprived of that lordly choice of Reason, and vigour of Will, which they had hitherto possessed, but must henceforward resign; an insidious and baleful influence, the more sinister in its effects because working in the innermost recesses of human thought—unexpressed to the world—and very often not properly recognised in its results by the individual himself.

31, STANLEY ROAD, BOOTLE,  
*August, 1877.*

## PART I.—THE CAUSATIONAL THEORY.

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### ON CAUSATION.

THE root of the whole matter is held by some philosophers to lie in the view to be taken of Causation. There is one view of Causation which identifies it with undetermined Will and Personality, and another which simply recognises uniformity of sequence, without saying anything more about it. There are some who recognise both views, and would demarcate their provinces, and others who ultimately identify Will and uniformity of sequence. The process of demarcation is one that has been going on from the commencement of human thought, and the result has been the greater, and still greater, accumulation of phenomena into uniformities of sequence, and the diminution of the number attributed to undetermined Will. The history of knowledge, and of the growth of the sciences, has been the history of the progressive recognition of uniformities of sequence, or what we shall hereafter call "law."

With the ultimate nature of Causation, this systematization of knowledge has nothing to do, nor does it come into conflict with any theory of it. It recognises certain phenomena as the uniform resultant of certain conditions, and nothing more. This systematization has been completed first in the simpler phenomena of practical life, and has been gradually extended as the observation of the order of phenomena has been extended, and as the powers of the intellect has been improved, or were directed into this particular line of activity, eventually giving rise to the thought of bringing all phenomena, including human life and human volition, within the sphere of law.



"The belief that events are determinately related to the state of things immediately preceding them is now held by all competent thinkers in respect of all kinds of occurrences, except human volitions. It has steadily grown, both intensively and extensively, both in clearness and certainty of conviction, and in universality of application, as the human mind has developed, and human experience has been systematized and enlarged. Step by step, in successive departments of fact, conflicting modes of thought have receded and faded, until at length they have vanished everywhere except from this mysterious citadel of Will." \*

This is the problem we have to consider. It is not necessary to take into account theories of Causation. What we wish to do is to find out if all the phenomena of human volition are governed by uniformities of sequence.

The theory which holds that they are so governed is called sometimes the Causational Theory, sometimes the Determinist Theory, or it might be called the Dynamical Theory, and, in fact, it is difficult to assign it a name that does not involve more than it should denote. Its name should indicate only uniformity of sequence, and in the use of any of the above titles in this Essay nothing beyond that is intended to be expressed.

The theory which teaches that there are some activities or volitions which are not so governed is called the Free Will Theory.

### THE CAUSATIONAL THEORY.

#### STATEMENT OF THE PHENOMENA OF HUMAN ACTIVITIES.

*The Law of Heredity.*—We find the law of heredity, or like producing like, pervading the whole vegetable and animal kingdoms, both in the broad and general fact of species producing their kind, and in the details of individual organisation and special characteristics. The study is not, however, a very simple one, for, in addition to the

composition of causes, due to the coalescence of two sets of individual characteristics, there are also the effects due to accidental circumstances. The result all the same is traceable to law.

The child, then, is born with an inherited constitution, with all that is therein involved, including in the first place a certain course of development and decay, extending over a number of years, and constituting the general physiological life of man.

But the child is born also with special characteristics; not every individual child can be educated and cultivated into any man, but each possesses from the first a definite physical constitution, definite proportions of parts, preponderances of systems or temperaments, which may be modified, but must always form the bases of development. Consequently, or independently of this, the child also possesses mental or moral activities of various descriptions, and differently proportioned, which, though highly susceptible of the influences of education and environment, are also ultimately derived by heredity.

*Adaptation to Environment.*—From the moment of birth, the organisation comes into relation with environment, which variously modifies the course of its development. The suitable or unsuitable conditions of mother's health, food, warmth, sleep, etc., variously affect the child, and thenceforward, all through life, the conditions of food, exercise, rest, climate, exposure, etc., have strong and recognisable effects upon the organisation.

*Special Tuition.*—Tuition affects the whole of the activities of the individual according to the nature of the training, its persistence, and the force exerted, and in relation to the original constitution of the child. The value of a long course of direct education is well understood in all civilised communities, and in modern times has been recognised as the one great means of effecting the thorough improvement of society, if it only could be thoroughly applied.

*General Tuition.*—In addition to the special tuition,



and through and by means of it, there is all the while going on the education of the individual into the general tone and principles of his age, country, class, sect, gradually fashioning him into a certain pattern; shaping him into the general mode of life; forming within him certain standards of action, certain codes of morality, customs, fashions, etc. He has implanted in him more or less the knowledge, the convictions—theological or otherwise—the intellectual attitude of his time.

*The Education of Circumstances* affects not only the physical constitution, but also very much the mental and moral qualities of the individual. Circumstances are infinite in their variety, and as applied to a great diversity of combination of natural qualities, it is impossible to do more than indicate the nature of them; for instance, good or ill usage, neglect or over-training, a solitary or a social position, surroundings of town or country, status of parents, character of companions, nature of and facilities for amusements and studies, the degree of early responsibilities, etc., and, afterwards, the nature of the business occupations or other avocations.

*The Growth of Reason.*—While these processes of education and adaptation are going on in relation to the natural development of constitutional activities, there is also coming forward that kind of activity we call Reason, which takes cognisance of these relations, and discerns the suitability or unsuitability of particular modes of relation, and seeks to effect that adjustment of environment and activity which is the most suitable, and that proper co-ordination of the activities amongst themselves which is also the most suitable. Thus man may by a natural intelligence choose, and by a natural power of resolution not only adjust himself to environment and environment to himself, but also educate himself, and designedly change the relative degrees of power of his natural activities. And as by well-recognised methods he may augment and diminish the size and force of various muscular combinations, so by methods equally well known may he

augment or modify the power of his mental and moral activities. But, as this natural intelligence, and this natural power of resolution, exist in certain definite dynamical relations with the other activities of his constitution, and as they themselves are causally related to antecedent conditions by the law of heredity, and to conditions affecting their strength or weakness, as above explained, they come within the general theory of Causation in respect to human activities.

*The Developed and Normal Man.*—What, then, is the result? Man, a well-defined and uniform mode of existence, which we can speak of and deal with as a whole?

With some degree of accuracy we can speak of man as a whole, in that he has a number of activities in common, although not possessed by all in equal degrees; but it sometimes leads to error to overlook this reservation and to speak of man as an abstraction, the terms of the discourse of which are applicable to every individual. But with the reservation that the various activities exist in all men in unequal degrees it is useful, and indeed necessary sometimes, to speak of man as a whole, although, for practical effect and detailed understanding it becomes essential to analyse and classify these activities into their proper order, and to study the methods of their action.

This analysis and classification, of course, has often been made, and forms the great sciences of physiology, and mental and moral philosophy.

#### *Classification of kinds of Actions.*

For my particular purpose, I consider them in respect of involuntary impulse, and rational direction, and distinguish between the activities as under, viz:—

*The Functional*, such as the action of the heart, the intestines, etc. These are involuntary, or beyond the influence of the directions of the Reason.

*The Muscular*, which are partly, almost wholly, in-



voluntary, as in the *position* of standing; and partly semi-voluntary, as in the *act* of walking, etc.

*The Emotional Involuntary*, such as the feelings and desires, and such as the muscular expression of some of them in laughing, crying, etc.

*The Emotional Volitional*, or actions proceeding from the emotions, constraining the intellect and the muscles to the means for their gratification, such as love, hate, etc.

*The Rational Volitional*, or actions thought out and decided upon by the reason or judgment in respect to their suitability in the relative adjustment of organisation and environment.

It is to be observed of this classification, that there is no strongly defined line separating the different kinds of actions in real life. In the quick and constant changes of human activity, the semi-voluntary, the emotional volitional, and the rational volitional, interchange with great rapidity, and even in the close examination of one accustomed to introspection it would be difficult sometimes to assign the specific quality of a given action. The one great point to be noticed in the above analysis is the distinction between the direct and immediate response of the organism to the conditions of the environment, or to the contact with objectivities, on the one hand; and the actions proceeding from rational considerations, as before explained, on the other hand. The quality to be taken notice of is the degree of involuntary action, or the degree of rational volition.

### *Man and his Motives.*

We have considered man as possessing definite hereditary activities, and we have considered him as having undergone processes of education by tuition, and adaptation. What is the result in the developed normal man?

The result is a wonderful complication, and combinations the most strange. In physical conditions we perceive the

diseased and the healthy. In the moral world, the depraved and the good. In the mental world, the idiot and the intellectual man. In the conduct of life, the fool and the wise man.

But the philosopher proposes to himself, like the chemist, to reduce all these to their elements. He sets to work to analyse all the moral and mental activities, and to classify them. By such means he arrives at the motives of action.

These are, firstly, those founded upon the physical necessities of man, viz., the desire for food, drink, warmth, comfort, the appetites, etc.

The Feelings or Emotions, such as love, hate, benevolence, love of praise, power, property, etc.

The Intellectual Faculties, which are also motives, in that they prompt to their occupation with their special subjects of interest; as the desire for knowledge, numbers, music, the fine arts, constructiveness, etc.

The Reasoning Faculty, as applicable on the one hand to the organisation of knowledge in general, or on the other hand to the practical relation of life and environment.

Peculiar Convictions, theological or otherwise, derived from tuition principally, which have almost the force of motives, and which depend ultimately upon motives.

Personal Influences, or the love of, and desire to please, particular persons.

These Emotions, and Intellectual Faculties as motives, are treated of in detail by mental and moral philosophers. It is sufficient for our purpose to notice that they are capable of being so analysed, and that they are found to exist in any given character in certain definite relative proportions of a generally permanent character, but modifiable by education, circumstances, or direct self-rule.

With the first cause of this state of things we have nothing to do; or rather, whatever theory we may hold as to the origin of man—whether he was created much as he is now, and was then left to himself in relation to his environment, to develop according to law; or, whether he



has developed from lower forms of life—does not affect our subject in the least. Our enquires are as to man as we find him—as to the agencies which do actually, at the present time, produce the individual; and as to what affects his development when so produced.

### *The Grounds of Belief.*

The grounds of belief in the Causational theory are, firstly :—

Self-Consciousness, or our own experience of ourselves, which tells us that we do no volitional action without a physical impulse, a motive, or a reason.

Experience. This is corroborated by our observation of the conduct of others. We perceive that all actions are undertaken for the gratification of motives, or for some reason commending itself to the mind of the actor. On the reliability of law in human conduct we place confidence in all personal dealings with other men; in the conduct of the family; in the education of youth; in the arrangements of business; in the operations of companies and organisations; and in those larger organisations called nations; in legislative enactments; the administration of justice, etc.

And taking a broad view of history from the earliest periods and all the world over, we find man's condition, his progress in the practical arts of life, his different degrees of attainment in social, political, mental and moral life, to have been developments resulting from a great variety and commixture of causes.

### DR. CARPENTER'S OBJECTIONS.

Having thus given a brief outline of the Causational Theory of Volition, an outline which will be further developed in the course of the Essay, let us now proceed to consider the objections made against it by Dr. Carpenter. He says, p. 4, "It seems to the writer, that every system of Philosophy which regards the succession of Mental Phenomena as

determined by the ordinary laws of Physical Causation, and which rejects the self-determining power of the Will (or, which is the same thing, regards the Will as only another expression for the *preponderance of motives*, or as the *general resultant* of the action of the Physical Mechanism), virtually leads to the same conclusions."

The conclusions referred to are, p. 3, "that thus man is but a *thinking machine*, his conduct being entirely determined by his original constitution, modified by subsequent conditions over which he has no control, and his fancied power of self-direction being altogether a delusion; and hence that *duty* or *responsibility* have no real foundation, man's character being formed for him, and not by him, and his mode of action in each individual case being simply the consequence of the reaction of his brain upon the impressions which called it into play. On this creed, what is commonly termed Criminality is but one form of Insanity, and ought to be treated as such. Insanity itself is nothing else than a disordered action of the brain, and the highest elevation of man's psychical nature is to be attained by all the conditions which favour his physical development."

This statement he justifies by a reference to "Atkinson and Martineau's *Letters*," in which book all mental phenomena are ascribed to material causes, from which it results that "I am what I am,—a creature of necessity; I claim neither merit nor demerit." "I feel that I am as completely the result of my nature, and impelled to do what I do, as the needle to point to the pole, or the puppet to move according as the string is pulled." "I cannot alter my will, or be other than what I am, and cannot deserve either reward or punishment."

In addition to this, Dr. Carpenter adduces certain abnormal conditions of the mind, viz., Reverie, Electro-Biology, Dreaming, Somnambulism, Mesmerism, and, I suppose, to some extent, Intoxication from alcohol, opium, and haschisch, in which the directing power of the Will is in abeyance, as clearly illustrating the nature of the Causational part of



human volition by absence of the self-determining power of Free Will (p. 6), "for the subjects of these conditions may *really* be considered (so long as they remain in them) as mere thinking automata, puppets pulled by leading strings, their whole course of thought and action being determined by suggestions conveyed from without, and their own Will having no power to modify or direct this, owing to the temporary suspension of its influence."

In his preface to the fourth edition, Dr. Carpenter re-states his objections, and for convenience I must summarise them as follows :--

1. That the Causational Theory of Volition is equivalent to Physical Causation, in which he cannot include Mental Phenomena.

2. Consequently, his objections to the Materialistic theory are applicable to the Causational theory as a whole, his special objections to the Materialistic theory being, as above expressed, (a) the abnormal states of reverie, intoxication, etc., as demarcating the extent of Physical Causation or reflex action; (b) psychical development dependent upon physiological cultivation; (c) the non-correlation of force of cerebral action with the results of thought.

3. That on the Causational theory, whether Materialistic or otherwise, man is an automaton; and also that this theory is incompatible with the exercise of Choice.

4. That the Causational theory is incompatible with the phenomenon of Effort.

5. That consequently upon there being no Choice, there can be no blameability or responsibility.

#### ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE CAUSATIONAL THEORY WITH THE MATERIALISTIC HYPOTHESIS.

Causation refers to the uniform sequences of phenomena. For human convenience, phenomena and their order in sequence are divided into classes forming the different sciences, and it would be sufficiently correct to speak of

Model

Chemical Causation, Electrical Causation, etc. So there may be a class of phenomena to which it may be correct to apply the term Physical Causation. Whether certain phenomena are to be classed together and included in one or other of these categories, is a matter of observation, inference, and discrimination, and of the use of words. Whether mental and moral phenomena are to be included in "the ordinary laws of Physical Causation" may therefore be a proper enquiry. But even if it be decided that they are so to be included, it would not alter the subsequent separate classification of them, nor would it alter the nature of the applied causes to produce effects, such as persuasion, argument, appeals to conscience, etc., although these would have to be called appliances of Physical Causation. Under such a classification, the laws of thought would appear in a treatise on Physics, or Physiology and Ethics would come in as part of the Physiology of the Brain and Nervous System. I will consider in the next section, however, the objections advanced to the Materialistic hypothesis. In the meantime, I, with Dr. Carpenter, deny the validity of that hypothesis, but maintain as intact the Causal theory. Causation refers to the uniformity of sequences amongst phenomena. Amongst the classifications of phenomena are the mental and moral. It is asserted that amongst these, certain uniformities of sequence are found to prevail; in fact, it is asserted that uniformity of sequence, or law, is found to prevail throughout them, to be universal amongst them. That quite apart from any dependence upon the physiological organisation, and simply studied upon and amongst its own phenomena, men are found to possess mental and moral qualities derived hereditarily from their progenitors, qualities that are capable of education and modification by circumstance, as already explained. And thus it comes about that, quite apart from physical or physiological connections, we have a class of mental and moral phenomena of which it is said that they are governed throughout by Causation.

Causation implies uniformity of succession in time, without implying community of nature. Thus between various



sets of phenomena there may be established the connection which we term Causation, and this will hold good, whatever opinions we may hold about the nature of these various sets of phenomena, whether we call them spiritual or material, or by any other fanciful or reasonable name. The assertion is that uniformity of sequence holds good throughout all spiritual as well as throughout all material phenomena. Indeed, I am surprised that Dr. Carpenter should have introduced this element of confusion. It is a stock objection, and is always met by the same unanswerable reply. The question of Materialism may be interesting and important, but is utterly irrelevant to the subject which Dr. Carpenter has at heart. The discussion is not between Materialists and Spiritualists, but between those who hold the theory of Universal Causation and those who deny it.

"I have avoided using terms which imply Materialistic assumptions, because though a Materialist will naturally be a Determinist, a Determinist need not be a Materialist. In the above questions, a Materialist would substitute 'brain and nervous system' for 'character.' \* \* \* The substantial dispute relates to the causal connection of any volition with the state of things at the preceding instant, whether we specify these as 'character and circumstances,' or 'brain and environing forces.'"—(Sidgwick, *Method of Ethics*, p. 47.)

For this reason, it is quite unnecessary for me to deal with Dr. Carpenter's next set of objections, directed specially against the Materialistic hypothesis, but, as so much stress has been laid upon them in the indiscriminating attack made upon the Causational and the Materialistic theories as mutually bound to each other, and the fallacies of the reasoning being too tempting to pass over without exposure, I will devote a few pages to their consideration.

In the meantime, Dr. Carpenter admits the existence of a certain amount of Law which enables us to make a "forecast" of the course of action of individuals or communities; and referring to the assertion of the Causationalist, that if he

could grasp the whole of the antecedents he could correctly predict the result, no self-originating element having been found to interfere with the regular sequence of cause and effect, he says that the Causationalist has no right to *assume* this.

I reply that this is not an assumption. Men reason from the known to the unknown. Our ratiocinations are inferences that we make from sequences between phenomena which we know and understand to other sets of phenomena with which they have some marks of likeness. This may not be complete proof, but it forms a legitimate and sufficiently reliable hypothesis until we see reason to doubt it.

Such is the nature of the hypothesis stated. To verify it would require us to occupy a position which it is impossible for anyone to hold. We can never grasp the whole of the antecedents to an action in the mind of another man. These unknown antecedents Dr. Carpenter invests with the name of "residual phenomena," and adds, "the whole history of science shows that the investigation of 'residual phenomena' has been a most fertile means of discovering fresh agencies not previously suspected." I reply, that the whole history of science has proved most fertile in regard to "residual phenomena" in their being the means of discovering fresh laws, fresh uniformities of sequences, and has never once led to the discovery of an agency not governed by laws; but that the whole history of science has been the resolution of unknown agencies and fanciful forces and entities into systems of sciences, in which the universality of uniformity of sequence has been shown to be most complete; and that the whole reading and verdict of science is against him in his estimation of the logical import of "residual phenomena."

#### DR. CARPENTER'S OBJECTIONS TO THE MATERIALISTIC HYPOTHESIS.

Having already said that I do not accept the Materialistic hypothesis, and that, as I hold the Causational theory to



be true independently of that view, it is unnecessary for my purpose to discuss the objections raised by Dr. Carpenter to the Materialistic hypothesis. Nevertheless, in a critical essay on his book, it seems desirable not to pass them over altogether.

The first objection made is, that when men are in the abnormal states of reverie, somnambulism, intoxication, etc., they correctly indicate by their actions the nature of the automatic portion of their constitutions, that is to say, the nature of the activities of the brain and nervous system; and that which is missing, namely, the rational control of the thoughts and actions, indicates the nature of the spiritual influence, or Self-Determining Power. But this is not a legitimate conclusion, for it is just as reasonable to suppose that the influence thus put out of gear is cerebral, as that it is supra-cerebral. And even if it was proved to be spiritual or supra-cerebral, it would not be proved to be beyond the ordinary laws of Causation.

The next objection is, that on the Materialistic hypothesis it would follow that "the highest elevation of the psychical nature is to be attained by due attention to all the conditions which favour his physical development." Criminality being a form of insanity, and insanity a disordered action of the brain, it would seem that to keep the brain in proper order would prevent both insanity and criminality.

It will be seen, that if mental and moral activities are functions of the brain, they are, like all other physiological functions, dependent upon the condition of the organ, and the condition of an organ will depend upon the ordinary and general conditions of physiological health and activity. These conditions are, mainly, proper and suitable nourishment, repose, exercise. It can scarcely be denied that proper and suitable nourishment, sufficient and without excess, forms a most favourable condition for moral and mental life, and that if it ceased altogether the activities would terminate. The second condition, of repose, is equally essential to the mental and moral being, in fact, so essential that it can-

not get on without it. The third condition, exercise, is also essential. If the exercise of a certain set of muscles, say of the arm, is systematically neglected, the muscles become feeble; but if they are put through a constant and sufficient amount of exercise they develop in strength. So the brain, considered as the organ of mental and moral activity, needs exercise of a suitable kind for its physiological activities. The kinds of exercise for the development of the mental functions of the brain would be learning, reading, thinking, reasoning, etc., and the kinds of exercise required for the development of the moral functions of the brain would be associations with other individuals of specific character, contact with circumstances likely to call forth special characteristics, reading of a suitable kind, etc. And therefore it is true that, on the Materialistic hypothesis, "the highest elevation of man's psychical nature is to be attained by due attention to the conditions which favour his physical (*i. e.*, physiological) development." There is no inconsistency, because all mental and moral phenomena, and all their interactions are regarded as physiological phenomena, and this does away with the implied absurdity, that the conditions most tending to high physiological condition of the brain are muscular exercise, good order of the digestive, breathing, and circulative apparatus, or mere good feeding. For the good condition of any organ is dependent, to a great extent, upon the proper amount of exercise of its special function.

The aspect in which we must consequently regard criminality and insanity is not very important, that I can see. I am under the impression that in modern times it is generally considered that insanity is a disordered action of the brain, and to say that criminality is only a kind of insanity is a matter merely of nomenclature, for if it is only a form of insanity, it is a form requiring a special kind of treatment in order to effect a cure, and to prevent its spreading, namely, punishment by fines, pain, imprisonment, etc.

I confess I can scarcely understand Dr. Carpenter's



objection drawn from the theory of the Equivalence of Force. He contends that the force exerted by "the influence of a great idea conceived by a thinker in his closet, in dominating the action of an entire nation, is utterly disproportioned to any conceivable play of molecular forces that can be excited by the Physical agency of the thinker, in putting his idea into speech or writing;" and that the small expression of emotion in a touch, a look, or a tone which may change the whole course of two lives, cannot be co-related like the co-relations of physical forces, as being equivalent in measure of force. The difficulty is only much the same, it seems to me, as that of co-relating the force expended in the manufacture of gun-cotton, or dynamite, combined with the muscular exercise of applying a light, with the result of an explosion; or much the same as the application of a small force to an almost balanced rock on the steep side of a mountain, or to a mass of snow, with resulting destruction of houses and of life in its downward course. The case is not one of transference of force from one body to another, as in the case of a stroke applied to the first of a row of billiard balls, but is rather a case of direction or change of direction of forces already existing in other bodies, and the whole of the co-relation of force is not to be sought in the initial motion which produces the change of direction.

However, as I have already said, the question of Materialism is not involved in the discussion, and should not be mixed with the consideration of the Causational theory, as it leads to endless confusion; and I only refer to it in order to repudiate its connection with the subject. It also appears to me that a settlement of the question of Materialism is not to be attained by Dr. Carpenter's method of treatment.

#### ON THE CAUSATIONAL THEORY, AS MAKING MAN AN AUTOMATON.

Dr. Carpenter's third great objection to the Causational theory, whether Materialistic or otherwise, is, that by it

man is merely an automaton, incapable of choice and self-direction.

*Dr. Carpenter's definition.*

He says, "In the term 'Automatism,' as used here and elsewhere, I include not merely those *bodily*, but those *mental* activities, which are *determinately related to* (or, in other words, *are caused by*) previous bodily or mental activities, to the exclusion of all choice or self-direction on the part of the *ego*." By the phrase "to the exclusion of," I suppose is meant "which excludes." On this supposition man becomes merely "a puppet pulled by leading strings," and is capable of being "played upon," by any one who has mastered his "springs of action."

I now propose to make an exhaustive analysis of the term automaton, and seeing that it plays such a large part in contemporary discussion, it is important to know what is meant by it, and what is involved in it.

*Derivation.*

Derivatively the word is unmeaning. Self-moving is a phenomenon absolutely unknown. It implies self-creation, which is utterly inconceivable, and is of the same class as self-determining, self-existence, etc. At most it is a term that can properly be applied to distinguish some organisms from some inorganic substances, such as a man from a stone. All these compound words containing the words "self," or "auto," are radically vicious. Dr. Carpenter, for instance, places "automatic action," and the "self-determining power," in opposition; whereas, in derivation they are identical. He also applies the term to organs that never move except when in relation to some definite object, which can scarcely be said to be self-moving.

Some careful writers do not employ the word automatic at all, but use, instead of it, the term "reflex action," which is unobjectionable.



*Description of Automata proper.*

But, as an argument is founded on the word, we must consider it in its application. An automaton is an adaptation of substances by an intelligent being, so that on the application to it, more or less directly, by that intelligence, of a suitable force, in a suitable degree, certain definite movements take place. This is an identical definition with that of a machine, which is a term also used interchangeably with automaton in this discussion. The word engine does not appear, nor does it seem necessary to take notice of it as affording a better position in the argument, as it refers to arrangements of substances by an intelligence for a definite purpose.

In addition to their main characteristic of being manufactured articles, constructed by an intelligent being for a definite purpose, let us consider some minor ones, and see in what respects they agree with, and in what respects they differ from, those of a living organism.

In the main respect of production, living beings are generated by the combination of two cells, upon which ensues a process of development. The child is born; and thereafter follows a further course of development and decay. The automaton, as before noted, does not reproduce itself, nor does it exhibit a continuity of activity, but is in motion only when force is applied by intelligence, after which it remains at rest until again made use of. An animal is capable of motion, an automaton is incapable of it until set in motion by an animal. Due force has to be applied, and perhaps other conditions arranged before motion is obtainable. The spring has to be wound up, the strings pulled, the weight applied. So the manner of decay and renewal are different. In an organism there is waste all through the system, with processes of expulsion. The automaton made of inert substances, such as the metals, wood, leather, etc., wears out on its surfaces by friction, atmospheric influences, etc. The renewal in one case is by means of food and processes of

digestion and assimilation throughout the system ; in the other case by means of replacement, by an intelligent being, of the parts worn out.

There is a remarkable difference between organisms and automata proper in respect to the attainment of their powers ; the organism is trained either by education or by the influence of environment ; the automaton acts directly, without training, and cannot be trained or varied. Compare, for instance, the case of the walking doll and the case of the child learning to walk. A clock is not trained but manufactured.

So, in a physiological organism there is a certain power of adaptation to environment, and capacity of development of function by exercise. The muscles, the touch, the senses, the intelligence, all become more perfect according to the amount of their exercise ; but the automaton never varies—it is the same from first to last.

So also in respect of almost all animal organisms, there is a necessity for rest and sleep, which is not required by an automaton.

So there is a certain amount of discernment exercised by animals which is not exercised by automata, as in the choice of food, etc. There are automata frequently exhibited with labels affixed, “ put a penny in this hole, and ”—all sorts of things will happen, but if the weight is there, whether in bronze, silver, or gold, or more worthless metal, the thing will go so much, and no more and no less ; ships will ride up and down on the ocean, birds sing, and old women will be ground down into young ones.

There are many other respects in which physiological organisms and automata present very remarkable and forcible contrasts.

It follows from this comparison of organisms and machines that there is no specific agreement, but only an agreement in the most general laws of Causation. There is no respect in which the study of the laws of one throws light upon the laws of the other, and in the particular respect in which



the comparison is used, namely, the kind of action, automatic or self-moving, there is absolutely no correspondence; but that, by a strange misnomer, machines and automata, of all others having motions that are the furthest removed from automatic or self-moving (since they only move when force is applied, and then only as designed), are called by that name.

### *Automatism and Evolution.*

Automatism is either consistent or inconsistent with the Evolution theory. If automatism means that fixity and regularity of action which is the principal characteristic of machines, which do not adapt themselves in response to changes of environment, then automatism is inconsistent with evolution. But if automatism is consistent with evolution, then it admits of decay and development from disuse and exercise; admits of growth by education, of increase of power from use, of adaptation to circumstances, and change according to necessities. In this case automatism has not the fixedness of the former, and to say that man is an automaton does not involve anything like the mechanical idea, or fatalistic one, of being one thing, as a man finds himself, without the possibility of change, or of changing himself by adopting methods calculated to produce the alteration desired. And in this case it is not desirable to use the word automatic, since it is universally associated with that fixity and unchangeableness of action exhibited by machines, and what are usually called automata.

### *Against the use of Similes.*

It is no doubt convenient, in the exposition of an established theory, and which has to be explained to the comprehension of those who are not well versed in the terms of the subject, to employ illustrations and similes suitable to the purpose, and that are not likely to be misleading. Such illustrations have also a just use

in rhetoric, in giving beauty and effect to a discourse. But in the investigative and demonstrative processes of any branch of study they are very much out of place, and more decidedly so in the treatment of philosophical subjects, where the argumentation must be so close, and the terms employed so clear and well defined. For as the chemist uses the greatest and most scrupulous care, to the extent of inventing methods to ensure the cleanliness of his instruments and the purity of his materials, and also uses the greatest exactitude in the measurement of his quantities, so words and their import should be used with constant and strict exactitude in all philosophical discussions, and he who makes use of illustrations and figures of speech therein, prepares for himself pit-falls of language, in which he will inextricably flounder, without hope of ever standing on the surface again.

To see the viciousness of the loose employment of illustrations, we have only to take one or two of those made use of by Dr. Carpenter, as, for instance, likening "motives" to "springs." We wind up the spring of a walking doll, and placing it upon the table, off it goes. We made the doll, we made the spring, we made the legs, we wound it up, we placed it on the table. The whole thing originated in our own motives, and the doll is simply a method of employing our own forces for their gratification. It is an indirect method, but it amounts to the same thing as if we took two pieces of stick and placed them alternately before each other with our hands. In the case of marionettes the action is thus direct and immediate, though out of sight. In this likeness of human motive to the springs of an automaton, therefore, we liken it to itself in some of its manifestations. In fact, we liken human action to its own action.

No doubt the comparison is rendered more deceptive from the similitude of life with which these mechanical movements are clothed, and we are much more tempted to see a likeness between animal organisations and ingenious mechanical contrivances when they are veiled under the



covering of a doll, or a bird, and are made to simulate the movements thereof.

As to men mastering one another's springs of action, if men are puppets—I never heard of one puppet mastering the springs of action of another, or of one clock mastering another as to the time of day. And as to playing upon one another's motives, surely it is what we are all doing, more or less, all the days of our lives. We are constantly presenting reasons and attractions to one another, founded upon the knowledge we have of one another, in order to accomplish our own intentions. And it sometimes happens that we succeed, sometimes not, for occasionally, the other party will not be played upon, but wants to play upon ourselves.

When Dr. Carpenter calls man a "thinking machine," or speaks of the brain as the "mechanism of thought and feeling," as a mode of throwing discredit upon the Causational theory, he pursues the same line as when he calls man an automaton. In the meantime, it seems to me just as correct to call a machine an animal, as to call an animal a machine. If words are not to be confined to their proper and scientific usages, there can be no sound knowledge, no solid ground of argument, but only shifting sands and vain mirages of ever-changing deceits.

Another favourite simile of Dr. Carpenter's, and one which he seems to fall back upon as the grand solvent of all the difficulties of the subject, is that of the two knights and the shield. Dr. Carpenter seems to say that as the shield had two sides, so our question as to Causation of Volition has two sides; and, as in the former case both knights were partly wrong and both partly right so in the latter, those who think that all volition is caused are partly right, and those who think that volitions are not caused, or that there are some which are not caused, are partly right. The question is between those who assert that all volitions are caused, and those who deny it, and one or other is wrong. There is no question of partly right—partly right here has no meaning. As a matter of fact, both knights were

wrong, which is the same meaning as partly right, and may or may not be a correct simile; but it does not at all tend to a conclusion upon the enquiry as to whether all volitions are caused or not. So in his simile of the iron between two magnets, and the weights in the scales, he uses illustrations from the physical world to parallel those of the physiological, and in the confusion arising from the incompatibility, and even impossibility of supposing any similarity of conditions, draws out a dilemma for his opponents to solve. For my part I decline, as beyond my capability, of judging of the parallel between the magnet under the condition of stable equilibrium, and the action of the mind under conditions of unstable and constantly changing circumstances. The iron between the magnet, or the equally poised scales, may so remain for ever, but there is no parallel case in any position of the mind. Time passes; some little circumstance occurs which causes a decision. Or as between two equally forcible motives the reason will devise a means of decision, even it be by lot.

Similar confusion, as arises in all these cases, is caused by the use of the illustration of the automaton—for it is an illustration, and nothing more.

#### *Professor Huxley on Automatism.*

Of course I am aware that Dr. Carpenter does not say that man is an automaton, but only that on the Causational theory he must be so regarded. And he is justified to some extent by the phraseology and declared position of some of the necessitarians, to some extent also by the writings of some of our present most eminent scientific men. Professor Huxley, for instance, treats specially of this subject in an article in the *Fortnightly Review*, 1874, in which he gives an account of experiments made upon frogs, and also the very curious and interesting narrative of the French sergeant, with which we are now so familiar. The whole purport of this article is to the effect that frogs and human beings are automata, and he thus sums up his argument:—"It is quite



true that to the best of my judgment the argumentation which applies to brutes holds equally good of men; and, therefore, that all states of consciousness in us, as in them, are immediately caused by molecular changes of the brain substance. It seems to me that in men, as in brutes, there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism. If these positions are well based, it follows that our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism; and that, to take an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata, endowed with free will, in the only intelligible sense of that much abused term (inasmuch as in many respects we are able to do as we like), but none the less parts of the same great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, comprises that which is, and has been, and shall be—the sum of existence.”—(Huxley, *Fortnightly Review*, p. 577, 1874.)

I cannot say that I quite understand what is meant by “a symbol in consciousness,” and although I can accept the concluding section of the last sentence, I am wholly at issue with Professor Huxley in his employment of the terms “automata” and “automatically,” and in his statement that “we are conscious automata.”

#### *Automatism rendered into Causation.*

Professor Huxley seems in this summing up to identify automatic action with the general law of Causation, and in this case they would be convertible terms. Let us see how this works out.

On this rendering of the term automatic, all the following actions come within its scope of application. The fall of an apple to the ground, which is the automatic movement of the apple and the earth; the action of damp air on iron

producing rust, which is the automatic action of air and moisture and iron; the dissemination of rays of light and heat from the sun; the movement of winds and clouds. So also must the motions of the planets and satellites, the rise and fall of the tides, the precession of the equinoxes, the movements of the magnetic needle, all of them be deemed automatic. But if automatic action is identical with the word Causation, it is superfluous. All we know of Causation is uniformity of sequence, and to use the term automatic in its place is to substitute a vicious term for a good one.

Self-moving is a term as utterly incomprehensible as self-existence, and one to which we are quite incapable of attaching any meaning. It is inconceivable. And to say that automatic means movement uniformly occurring under conditions, is simply asserting Causation or uniformity of sequence in its widest scope, and applicable to all phenomena. The only legitimate divisions and sub-divisions of Causation are not into kinds of Causation, but according to classes of phenomena, their likeness and unlikeness, and orders of occurrence. From this arises the classification of the sciences. There will be found throughout them general laws of force, but they also have their special conditions.

If automatic action, then, is identical with universal Causation, there is no reason why it should be used specially in respect of the motions of machines, automata, or living organisation. But, as it is so used, it cannot be considered to be identical with general Causation, and it remains to examine what there is special and peculiar in the meaning of it, and for this purpose we must traverse the whole of the cases to which it is applied.

#### *What is there special in Automatism?*

It is to be presumed that it is not intended to include in it more than is included in the phenomena it is intended to describe. It is presumed that it is not a superfluous word, but one arising naturally out of the study of the phenomena;



and, therefore, necessary and indispensable in the statement of them, square and even with the subject, deliberately applied, and not one caught up at random from supposed resemblances.

The case of machines and automata has already received our attention, and we came to the conclusion that in respect to them the term automatic was illegitimate and absurd, and we have now to take up the consideration of Physiological Phenomena, and proceed to enquire if there is any proper use of the term in respect to any of them in detail; and if, therefore, man is to be considered a physiological automaton.

We will take those cases first where the use of the term is not, although it might be, disputed, namely, the case of the processes of digestion and assimilation of the food and collection of the waste, that is to say, the action of the stomach, intestines, liver, kidneys, heart, lungs, etc. This kind of action is sometimes called "reflex," sometimes "automatic." Its characteristics are that it takes place on contact with its related exciting cause. The presence of food, of partially digested food, of blood in different conditions, of air, excites activity in the different organs. But the contact of all things with the organs to which they are related does not produce action, as in the case of the contact of the foot with the ground, when the action of walking does not automatically take place. The application of the term to the organs of digestion, etc., seems not to be due to any positive quality of the actions, but to the negative one of their taking place without design, intention, or control on the part of the individual of whom they form part, whereas the actions of the limbs and feet are caused by such voluntary direction. The liver, heart, etc., are said to act *of themselves*, their operation cannot be commenced, regulated, or finished by an exercise of the will; they are utterly beyond control—and, "of themselves," refers not to self-originating action, but to the relation of the particular part to the whole of the organism, more especially the mind.

Not only are the actions of the heart, lungs, and digestive organs beyond control of the individual, but they are beyond their own control.

*Automatic identical with Involuntary.*

This is simply the old distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions; and, so far as we have got, automatic actions simply mean those physiological activities which occur without intention, direction, or control. Automatic and Involuntary are identical.

The characteristic of the automatic is the absence of reason. The beaver in the drawing-room piles up the hassocks and other small articles from the instinctive feelings which, in his proper habitat, would lead him to construct a dam. In the drawing-room his movements are objectless, his labour without a purpose. There is an absence of reason. His actions are uncontrolled by reason; they are the spontaneous actions we call instinct. If he could realise his position, and reason upon the subject, and his reasoning powers were strong enough to influence his conduct, it is to be supposed that he would not act as he does.

Formerly the distinction between voluntary and involuntary used to be held as a very marked distinction, but the investigations of late years have shown that a very large proportion of actions that had been held to be designed and intentional are really performed involuntarily, so that it has really become less and less clear where the two classes of actions begin and end, and, in fact, there are some actions which are sometimes of one character and sometimes of the other.

Professor Huxley, in the article before referred to, gives an account of experiments made with frogs, minus the brain, which are very remarkable, as exhibiting the extent of actions which that animal can perform without it.

The case of the French serjeant is singular, and perhaps



instructive, as exhibiting the different processes of human activities, with and without other combinations of human activities.

The frog jumps, swims, balances itself, and rubs acid off its right thigh with the left foot, all without a brain. This shows, what, in the normal state, can be done without cerebral influence. We also see what is left undone, and, therefore, what the brain is essential for, viz.:—its movements are unrelated to surrounding circumstances beyond immediate and actual contact. The frog does not move unless touched; it does not seek refuge, it does not seek food. None of its movements go beyond relation to actual contact. Such is the characteristic also of the movement of the centipede deprived of its head. The motion of the feet continues, and if the animal comes up against an obstacle higher than itself, it remains against it, the legs still going.

In the case of the French serjeant we have no removal of the brain, but only the brain more or less affected, both the degree and the manner of it quite unknown, and we have no right to assume that all that he does in his abnormal state is done without the control of reason. What may be the nature of the process by which the placing of a roll of papers in his hands while in this abnormal condition results in his supposing himself in a *café chantant*, we cannot tell, but thereafter his actions are rational, *i.e.*, adapted to the circumstances of his supposed position. That his senses of perception are quite, or partially, out of accord with surrounding actualities is the broad feature of the case, and how we can argue about the conduct of a man under such circumstances, *i.e.*, in a condition of illusion as to his environment, or delusion, as the case may be; and how we are to make any predication about the amount of involuntary action, and the amount of voluntary action, performed on the supposition of his being in a battle, or in a singing saloon; and how we are to attach any value to the conclusions arrived at, I do not quite see. The ordinary involuntary or reflex activities of sight, touch, taste, etc., are admittedly

suspended in this instance, and the case in question is of no more worth than thousands of other cases of insanity and delusion.

The above case shows, it seems to me, that the correct or incorrect cognition of perceptions of the external world depends upon the condition of the brain. Further, that mental and moral processes, so far as we know them, are dependent to some extent, or altogether, upon the condition of the brain, which is Causationalism, but is not Automatism, unless Automatism means Causation.

This brings us to the consideration of mental and moral phenomena with the view of ascertaining to what extent they are voluntary or intentional, and to what extent they are involuntary, or so-called automatic; the final question as to whether the volitional or intentional are to be regarded as involuntary, or so-called automatic, being reserved.

The child being born, as before stated, there results a process of development according to initial hereditary tendency and the nature of the environment. Experiences of pain and pleasure begin early, and the association of them with perceptions and actions. These are all involuntary, so, no doubt, are the feelings of hunger, thirst, longing for sweets, afterwards for pretty things and toys, also feelings of affection and dislike. It would seem also that perception, and the processes of classification to a certain extent, *i.e.*, so far as things come under notice unsought, are involuntary, and to the same extent the processes of reasoning on the circumstances of the environment in relation to the individual. There are cases where certain intellectual functions seem automatic from the first, as in the case of Mozart in respect of music, and Zerah Colburn in respect of calculation.

It can scarcely be said, however, that, as a rule, going to school and learning lessons is automatic, in the same way as breathing and digesting. In fact, it seems the very reverse—anti-automatic. The whole process of education has to be bolstered up with rewards and punishments, carried out by a considerable amount of moral and physical force.



The education of conduct is undertaken on the very basis that proper conduct is not automatic, and it is found to be difficult on that very account, both on the part of the teacher and on the part of the taught. This also is sought to be effected by the present enjoyment or expectation, of pleasures, or by the penalties of pain.

But this education that we refer to is in the first instance intentional and designed. Its object is to fit the individual to the circumstances of his present and future environment. This is a volitional or rational end, and its methods are the same.

### *Practical Reason.*

Let us, therefore, at once proceed to a consideration of the nature of Reason. In the first place I distinguish between the intellectual processes of classification, generalisation, synthesis, analysis, ratiocination, and induction, and what I call the Practical Reason.\* The distinction being not in the mental processes, but in the objects to which they are applied. I base my definition of Practical Reason on the definition of life. Life is the continuous adjustment of internal activities to environment. Individual life is the adjustment of the activities of the individual to the circumstances of the environment. Practical Reason is the recognition of the nature of the activities of the individual in the largest sense, and the recognition of the circumstances of the present and future environment, and it concerns itself with the adjustment of each to the other in the utmost degree. It seems to me that we are also entitled to speak of a general Practical Reason being the sum of human experiences in this respect, and to the operation of which, in forming individuals born into it, I previously referred. As to whether it is automatic or not, is a question I have already alluded to as specially reserved.

\* Since first writing this Paper, in which I used the words Reason and Wisdom, I have found in Mr. Sidgwick's *Method of Ethics* the term Practical Reason, and have adopted it.



The position I have so far advanced is the control exercised by parents, tutors, and society in general over the process of education, by virtue of Practical Reason, in addition to a natural growth of this Practical Reason in the individual himself.

*Muscular Activity as Controlled.*

We have referred before to the action of the foot not being determined by direct contact with the ground, to walk, but as constrained to go through certain movements. Control, or constraint by one part of the organism over another, is an admitted fact. I see a glass of wine before me on the table. I have experienced pleasurable sensations before in drinking wine, the desire is kindled at the sight of it, and the muscles are put in use in order to produce a like pleasure. Or, the Practical Reason, judging that wine in general, or this glass of wine in particular, is not on the whole suitable to the organism at this time, controls the muscles of the arms to remain quiescent, and, perhaps, the muscles of the legs are constrained to carry the body away to some other spot. In this and similar ways, the Practical Reason exercises control. The growth of it in the individual commences early, but it is of slow development, and according to natural capacity and the extent of observation and experience.

*Emotions, Feelings, or Motives as Controlled.*

In my exposition of human activities I referred to the Emotional Volitional as those actions which proceeded direct from the Passions or Emotions intent upon their gratification without regard to consequences, and without the assent of the Practical Reason, yet constraining the ratiocinative processes, or cognition of circumstances, and judgment of means to ends, only to execute its purposes, such as passion, revenge, drinking, the gratification of a vice, grief, laughter, affection, love of power, property, approbation, etc. Such

modes of action we might designate as involuntary or automatic; yet as they are volitions, or conscious acts of the individual, there would appear to be some contradiction of terms. Volitions are, properly speaking, conscious actions, but from paucity of terms I am obliged to classify them into Emotional Volitional and Rational Volitional; and yet I must call the former automatic or involuntary, not only in their inception as feelings, but in their subsequent action. This difficulty and apparent contradiction, will, however, it seems to me, disappear in pursuing our subject. For the cases of purely Emotional Volitional Actions are, or ought to be, very rare. The infant clutches at the object of attraction directly he sees it. The dog has the forbidden morsel in his mouth before he knows it; so has the child. Blows have been struck, murders committed, and seductions effected, before men and women, as the saying is, knew where they were. The passion was strong, the thing was done before the Practical Reason had even considered; and sometimes, such its strength, done in spite of the Practical Reason foretelling the consequences,—in spite, also, of other emotions tending the contrary way.

Here it is desirable to note that in any conflict of motives, if it results in action, that action is purely Emotional Volitional. What control or restraint is exercised is of an emotional nature.

#### *Practical Reason as Controlling.*

But there are seldom any conflicts of this sort without the Practical Reason as an element. Whatever education has been received has to some extent included in it a cognition of the relations of the organism, as a whole, with the present and future environment; and also, more or less bitter experience has taught the necessity of looking at the consequences of actions. So that although sometimes men may give way to the Emotional Volitional—and the course of life of large masses, unfortunately, in some respects, is too



much governed by the Emotional Volitional— still, in many respects, and in various degrees, some part of the conduct is regulated by the Practical Reason, and it enters as an element into almost every action.

We must also note, parenthetically, the emotional nature of intellectual qualities, such as music, number, desire for knowledge, cumulative or ratiocinative, constructiveness, etc. These are all active motives, and as such are Emotional Volitional, in that they are occasionally strong motives seeking to attain their own gratification.

And it must also be borne in mind that all these motives, corporeal, emotional, or intellectual, exist in different individuals in different degrees, according to initial hereditary constitution or subsequent environment; that they do not exist in all individuals in equal degrees.

#### *Intermediate Summary.*

It will be seen, then, that the position I hold is this :

That the functions of such organs as the stomach, liver, etc., are involuntary, and may be termed automatic by those who prefer that term.

That involuntary and automatic are convertible terms.

That muscular action, as a rule, is not voluntary or involuntary in respect to itself, but constrained by either :—

1. The Emotional Volitional, including all passions, emotions, and motives, which is in itself involuntary or automatic, both in inception of feeling and in all subsequent direct acts done without control of the intention and design of Practical Reason; or in so far as it is not so controlled by Practical Reason; or in so far as it acts in opposition to it; the control of one motive in restraint of another being also Emotional Volitional.

2. The Rational Volitional, the faculty which might conceivably be the sole ruler of the conduct, a faculty which takes cognisance of all the nature of the individual, and



of all the circumstances of the environment, present and future, and decides upon the most suitable action.

*Choice, the function of Practical Reason.*

I lay the whole stress upon this distinction, and, to anticipate somewhat, hold that the phenomenon of "choice" is the exercise of this faculty. I assert that, like all other human faculties, it is derived hereditarily, and exists in different individuals in different degrees; that it is developed by direct education, and by the indirect education of experience; that in so far as it exercises a predominating influence in any individual character, so far his life is governed and directed by choice and intention, and so far his actions are voluntary and not automatic. That no life can be so governed as to bring it wholly within the sphere of voluntary control, I admit; nor is any character so permanently established and thoroughly unchangeable as never to vary, and predominating characteristics mean *generally*, and not *uniformly*, predominant. Therefore, it is most correct to say that in so far as any life is governed by Practical Reason, it is voluntary, and in so far as it is governed by the Emotional Volitional, it is involuntary or automatic. Or, to revert to old phraseology, and to translate old terms into new, men exercise Free Will, or Free Choice, in so far as their actions are governed by Practical Reason. Any individual man is a free agent whenever his action is decided by Practical Reason, and in proportion to the number of his actions so decided, in that proportion, and no more, is he a Free Agent. But as all his actions are not of this character he is not wholly a free agent. And in proportion to the number of men whose actions are predominatingly decided by Practical Reason, so are men, as a whole, Free Agents. But as a comparatively small number of men are governed predominatingly by Practical Reason, so it cannot be said of men collectively that they are conspicuously free agents; at the same time, as a great many do to

a considerable extent govern their lives, so man to a considerable extent is possessed of Free Choice, and as this power is capable of cultivation, so men may become more and more free agents. But it is difficult to speak of men collectively, for there are so many millions of men all over the world, occupying various stages of civilisation, and even if we confined our observations to Europe, there are so many stages of society, and so many degrees of self-government and of automatic life, and so many difficulties in judging of the interior qualities of actions and modes of life, that we are perhaps not justified in making any general assertion. Take, for instance, the case of the drinking classes, and ask the question how far these govern their conduct by Practical Reason—how far they are free agents. And, on the other hand, take the case of the ordinary respectable families who lead well-ordered lives; how far is their course due to choice, how much to a well-balanced co-ordination of motives? And as to dealing with an abstraction called man, the question is utterly futile. There is not only no such being, but there is nothing in men collectively, in this respect, held so much in common as to justify us in a general predication. So that in answer to the question, Is man a free agent? the answer would be, Most men are in greater or in less degrees free agents, principally the latter. Or, Most men are free agents sometimes; or, mostly—according to our estimate of the predominance of Practical Reason in the conduct of the lives of men.

That which in each individual is under the control of the practical reason is voluntary, that which is beyond its control is automatic or involuntary. The province of each in every individual is perpetually changing; that which is volitional becoming automatic, that which is automatic becoming volitional. The automatic may be good or bad, and the voluntary, by long continuance of habit and education, may become automatic, and if it is a good quality in a just degree, *i.e.*, in good adjustment to environment, we obtain the ultimate highest nature.



For it is a mistake to suppose that the attainment of the highest point of Practical Reason is absolutely the best, unless it also has the effect of inducing upon the nature the automatic, that is to say, of forming and preparing the character in such a way that it perpetually responds automatically in the best manner to the various changes of environment, without, however, losing its own ruling power.

The great aim is that a man shall make himself automatically do right, that he cannot do wrong or commit an injustice, that it is impossible for him to tell a lie or do a mean action.

Freedom of choice, properly speaking, is not freedom to choose between evil and good, freedom to do this or that in accordance with different desires of gratification, but founded upon the definition of life, and founded upon the definition of Practical Reason, the power to do that which Practical Reason decides is the most *suitable* action in the relation of the organism to the environment.

Great is the victory of the man who possesses, or attains to, this predominance of the Practical Reason, who is volitional, who can choose his actions, and adjust the course of his life. How much is in the power of any of us, and how much each may attain for himself, we do not altogether know; but there is a general belief that there is a degree of it in every man, and certainly a capacity for attaining a higher degree of it, and this is shown in the views of merit and demerit, culpability, and blame attached to those who fail of accomplishment, and allow themselves to become creatures of automatism, if that automatism is unjustifiable from suitability.

### *Is the Rational Volitional Automatic?*

The answer, then, to the question we proposed ourselves, Is man a physiological automaton?—or, leaving out of account any Materialistic tendency of that question, Is man an automaton?—we have found to be: In so far as his actions



are determined by the non-Rational Volitional, but not in so far as they are determined by the Rational Volitional.

But we have now to push on the question to the uttermost point, and ask ourselves whether this quality or faculty of the Practical Reason, being in the first instance hereditarily derived, and existing in different degrees in different men, and in relative degrees in each individual to other faculties or motives, and being subject also to the ordinary laws of education and development, is not involuntary or automatic in its action, and coincident in every respect with all those activities we have included in the Involuntary and Emotional Volitional.

The difference between involuntary actions and rational volitional actions is thus characterised: the former are direct, immediate, uniform, simple, irrespective of consequences, un-co-ordinate; the latter are indirect, sometimes deferred, varied, complex, regardful of consequences, co-ordinate.

The difference between the rational volitional and the automatic is to be described in the same terms.

The difference between the automatic and the involuntary is not to be distinguished. Therefore they are identical terms.

To take a case:—If I have before me a glass of wine, I reach forward to take it (involuntary or automatic). The suggestion occurs as to the desirability or undesirability of drinking it (involuntary or automatic). I proceed to consider the subject (voluntary). At this point the difficulty occurs. If the act of deliberation thus induced is called automatic, then that term is inclusive of Reason, of Choice, of Rational Volition, and all the related phenomena; but, if it is held to include all these, then the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary is obliterated, and the term automatic becomes identical with human activity generally, and only differs from general Causation as referring to a part of it, that is to say, the laws of physiology, and the laws of mental and moral phenomena; and we start again to investigate

these laws, quite irrespective of the name we have found to be applicable to them as a whole.

If, on the other hand, we say that this act of deliberation so induced, is not automatic, then we exclude the use of that term from deliberative processes, and make it identical with involuntary.

In the one case it is enlarged to identity with Causation, in the latter it is narrowed to identity with involuntary.

In the respect, then, that the Practical Reason is caused by antecedents, in its degrees, inter and outer relations, and is modified by circumstances, it is subject to the general laws of human activities, and, therefore, it comes strictly within the Causational theory, and in this respect I claim for it no difference from the other human activities. In ultimate analysis, it must be reckoned as also in part Emotional Volitional; in that it has object matter as before defined, and is a natural activity, seeking gratification. But in the respect that the object matter of all the other activities is special, and they seek gratification directly or immediately, irrespective of consequences, the object matter of the Practical Reason is the whole of these activities in relation to environment, and their rational control and direction—this rational or reasonal characteristic, for the due co-ordination of activities in the present and the future, being the distinguishing one. But automatic action being the direct and immediate response to presence of object, lacks the element of co-ordination, and, therefore, the rational characteristic, and is only justified by the Practical Reason, whereas the Practical Reason justifies itself, and possesses, in addition to its own character as emotional, the character of rational, or co-ordinative, which the others do not possess.

But if the Practical Reason is subject to Causation, and thereby becomes automatic, then everything that is subject to Causation becomes automatic, and automatic and causational become convertible terms, and all special meaning is refined away from the term automatic. The inclusion of the Practical Reason in the term automatic destroys it.



It is, therefore, a term applicable only to those activities that respond directly to the specially related object. I, therefore, agree with Professor Huxley in his conclusion that men are the products of past Causation, but do not agree with him in calling men automata, because, although the Practical Reason is caused, yet, inasmuch as it directs its attention (and the direction of the attention is caused by the nature of the activities and circumstances) to the relations of the activities, and the direction and ordering of them, I cannot class it with those activities which, in consequence of their tendency to a direct response to the objects with which they are related, are called automatic. The Practical Reason has a power of saying :—This activity of appetite is too great, and is apt to finish off the whole organism prematurely, or to otherwise interfere with the general gratification of the activities, and relation to other men and circumstances; or this other activity is too weak, I will, therefore, re-adjust. Moreover, I judge it to be capable, not only of thus developing a strong power out of a weak one by self-education, but almost of imitating the processes of nature, and starting a new one, within limits and under conditions, if not in one generation, then in more than one.

My argument is this:—If Automatism includes all human activities, if it includes rational volitions, then it is an identical term with Causation, has no special meaning, and should be discarded; but, if it has a special meaning, and we conduct a search through human activities to see where it can be applied, we find that it is only applicable to non-volitional activities; being only a negative predication; and equivalent to the old word involuntary; therefore superfluous, and should be discarded. In addition to this negative reason against its use is the positive one that it is derivatively unmeaning, or has only a limited special relational meaning, that it is vicious and misleading in actual use in giving an idea of fixity, uniformity, limitation, and “mechanical character” to human activities, which does not correspond with the actuality.



*The Practical Reason as a Motive.*

In connexion with the phenomena of Choice as the function of the Practical Reason, it might be asked. Is this faculty, then, a calculating power only, pointing out the eventualities of actions, and, as it were, recommending the fittest? I would answer, that it has combined with it, or is itself a motive, having for its object the adjustment of the inner activities and outer environment. That this constitutes a desire for a course of action and mode of life which shall be a perfect adjustment with all the circumstances of the environment, and of all the different motives in relation to each other. I hold that it exists in different degrees in different individuals; but being the latest in the order of development it is the highest outcome of civilisation.

ON THE OBJECTION THAT CHOICE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH  
THE CAUSATIONAL THEORY.

I now come to the second part of Dr. Carpenter's objection to the Causational theory as involving Automatism—namely, the consequent incompatibility of the phenomena of Choice with that theory. The answer follows naturally from the foregoing. The Practical Reason is resultive of Causation; but, inasmuch as it does not immediately respond to an external object, but only relates to the relation of that object with an internal activity, it is not, properly speaking, automatic. Choice, it is true, is incompatible with Automatism, but it is not incompatible with the Practical Reason as included in the Causational. In fact, I identify Choice with the function or activity of the Practical Reason.

The Practical Reason, as already pointed out, recognises the necessity of a continuous adjustment between the inner activities and the environment. For the bases of its judgment it has observation, recollection, and the great body of human experiences handed over to it; it exercises attention, calculates the eventualities of actions, decides on the whole what is the best course to pursue, chooses. In this

respect it stands to the *ego* as to another party external to it, and decides simply on the fitness of the action as relative to the individual and the environment. This is Wisdom, and the word Wisdom may stand interchangeably with the term Practical Reason.

In proportion, and whenever it is preponderant, it determines actions, and being unobstructed by the preponderance of other motives, or otherwise, is free, and this constitutes free choice. But it may be urged that as free only means unobstructed, then the preponderance of other motives resulting in action constitutes them free. That is true, they are free, because unobstructed; and their resultant action is called free action, and may properly be called "Free Will," but it is not called "Free Choice." Action as the result of any motive is free because it is unobstructed, as shewn by its action; but it is not an action of choice, but of automatic or direct response to the object without choice. Only the action of the Practical Reason is choice, and, of course, it is free, or it would not have taken place. I define Choice, therefore, as the unobstructed action of the Practical Reason in the judgment of actions.

And not only is the Practical Reason capable of choosing amongst external actions, but it is capable of choosing amongst the actions of the intellect, *i.e.*, its own reflections, reasonings, objects of attention, &c.

I therefore maintain, as against the position that some necessarians might hold, that men in greater or less degrees, and in some matters according to their constitutional characteristics and environment, possess the power of choice amongst actions, and, in some cases, to a very considerable degree indeed.

And, as against Dr. Carpenter, I maintain that the Causal theory holds good throughout all mental and moral phenomena, including that particular one called Choice, which he holds to be incompatible with it, and which incompatibility necessitates the construction of a theory of a power transcending Causation.



*Choice Incompatible with Automatism.*

With Dr. Carpenter, I hold that Choice proper is incompatible with Automatism. Automatism is the immediate response of an organ to the presence of its related object. The only kind of Choice that is compatible with Automatism is the choice of degree; as, for instance, if a child, or a beggar, be given the choice of one half-crown or eight, the choice of the greater number would seem to be automatic; but if, even in simple cases like this, the degree is so small, or so great, as to excite other motives, then the resultant choice loses its automatic character. Choice, properly speaking, is choice, not of degree, but of kind, as between different motives, and this would be the analysis of the choice of doing, or refraining from, actions.

*Choice Compatible with Causation.*

I do not know that I can add anything further to the attempt I have made to shew the compatibility of Choice with Causation. Of course, if the *word* Choice be held to exclude Causation, it cannot be reconciled with it. But if the mental phenomena to which we give the name of Choice be intended, then I consider that these phenomena, both as known to us by consciousness, and by observation, are quite compatible with, and can, in fact, be explainable in no other way than by, the Causational theory. The *feeling* of choice is the consciousness of the operations of the Practical Reason.

The word Choice may, through obscure, but old and strong, associations, still retain within it some metaphysical meaning, but is not so radically vicious as to need to be discarded. On the contrary, it contains so much and true meaning to which no other word is equal, that it may, with a proper definition, be retained.

In concluding this section, I would ask attentive consideration in the mind of the reader to this phenomenon of Choice. I will ask him if he ever did anything voluntary



without a *motive* or a *reason*. (Involuntary acts are not questioned.) I candidly confess that I have not, and I challenge any one to say that he has, and to explain it. In considering human actions, we habitually regard them as involuntary or as voluntary, and if voluntary, we habitually trace them back to a motive or a reason, and we can do no other.

Dr. Carpenter, it may be remarked, does not attempt to shew the incompatibility of Choice with Causation, but simply advances his consciousness that Choice and Self-direction are exercised by a self-determining power, not subject to uniformities of sequence, having no motives, no reasons, no influences of Causation, and of which no derivation is assigned. All I can say is that I have no such consciousness, and do not think that Dr. Carpenter, or anybody else, has. If there is such a power, it can only be known to us by its phenomena—for we cannot know powers but by their effects—and if we know it by its phenomena, what are they? and how are they distinguished from other human activities? and when they are described, perhaps we might find laws of sequence.

But this objection is sustained by considerations of responsibility, “for without choice there is no responsibility.” This subject we hold in reserve until we have considered the nature of the phenomena of Effort, on which is grounded another objection.

#### MR. SIDGWICK ON THE PRACTICAL REASON AND FREE WILL.

In order to avoid any misconceptions which might arise from the identification of Choice with the preponderance of activity of the Practical Reason, I think it well here to take notice of the identification of Free Will (not *Free Choice*) with the Practical Reason, which Kant, and others after him, have sought to establish. (Sidgwick's *Method of Ethics*, p. 43.) Free, as I understand it, is unobstructed, and Will, the strongest activity for the time being, which may be either

of the class Emotional Volitional, or Rational Volitional. The Will of a man, then, is the succession of predominant activities, and is, therefore, always free, so far as he himself is concerned— that is, so far as he is not exteriorly constrained. All men, therefore, at all times, exercise Free Will. I maintain that this is the only legitimate use of the words. Freedom of Choice is a different thing, and must not be identified with Freedom of Will; and, as to how far it is possessed by men, I have spoken above. I think that what is so ardently advocated in the claims of Free Will is really Free Choice, or the unobstructed action of the Practical Reason.

This is remarkably exemplified in Mr. Sidgwick's advocacy of Free Will. He says (the italics are my own):— “ This almost overwhelming cumulative proof (*i. e., of the Causational theory*) seems, however, more than balanced by a single argument on the other side (*i. e. Free Will*): the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate volition (*Rational Volitional*). It is impossible for me to think at such a moment that my volition is completely determined by my formed character, and the motives acting upon it (*i. e., Emotional Volitional only, which is quite true*). . . . No amount of experience of the sway of motives even tends to make me distrust my intuitive consciousness that in resolving after deliberation (*i. e., deliberation is the adjustment by the Practical Reason of inner activities with present or future environment, or of the relations of activities*) I exercise free choice (*note the change of term*) as to which of the motives (*Emotional Volitional*) acting upon me (*within me, not upon*) shall prevail.” With which conclusion I fully agree, and whenever a man can and does deliberate and resolve in this way, he exercises Free Choice, and in so far as a man can *habitually* deliberate and resolve in this way, he possesses the power of Free Choice, ordinarily, but mistakenly, called Free Will; and those who in single instances, or habitually, have their actions determined by the Emotional Volitional



possess Free Will, just as much as the other class, but do not possess to that extent the power of Free Choice.

This view of the matter seems confirmed by Mr. Sidgwick's own statement, that "it seems to be only in moments of Deliberation that I become conscious of Freedom; . . . Conscious, that is, that 'I' am to some extent distinct from and independent of my formed character, and that I can choose to be swayed by motives, of which the impulsive force (so far as I can estimate it) is less than that of conflicting motives" (p. 51).

The process of deliberation, as before explained, is a process distinguished from the impulsive by the action of Reason, and the Reason occupies itself with judging of the relations of activities to activities, or activities to environment; so also it is only in moments of deliberation that Choice is exercised; therefore we connect the two factors occurring in the same phenomenon, as cause and effect, and assign Choice as the effect of the cause Reason; expressed generally, whenever any being exercises reason with regard to its activities, it results in choice, and negatively, no being exercises choice that is devoid of reason.

The identification of the *ego* with the Practical Reason Mr. Sidgwick has effectually disposed of, nor does it affect our subject.

#### ON THE OBJECTION THAT EFFORT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CAUSATIONAL THEORY.

Another objection brought against the Causational theory by Dr. Carpenter, is that the phenomenon of effort is incompatible with it.

#### *Effort Inconsistent with Automatism.*

I agree with Dr. Carpenter, that it is inconsistent with Automatism, which is the natural immediate response of an activity to the presence of the external object, to which it is



related, like food and air to the stomach and the lungs. The presence of a book in the hands of a schoolboy does not result in the immediate absorption of learning, nor does he take to arithmetic like a duck to water. All learning, throughout life, as a rule, requires the exercise of effort. So the accomplishment of all labour, all ends, of whatever character, all through life, requires effort.

Effort may be described as the consciousness of the straining of an activity towards its object as opposed to other activities, or as opposed to inertia.

Dr. Carpenter thinks, however, that this explanation of Effort is insufficient. He thinks that between the desire to go out for a walk, for instance, and the desire to sit still by the fireside, there is not simply the dynamic result of the strongest desire prevailing, but that there intervenes a third activity, which first chooses and then enforces. I think, with him, that a third activity may intervene, namely, the Practical Reason, which after deliberation chooses. But what about enforcing? Well, we have already seen that the Practical Reason is also a motive, and thus it adds the weight of its motive to the weight of the motives to sit still or go out, and thus effects one course or the other.

But, it may be said, this is good as far as it goes, but is an insufficient representation of the phenomena of Effort, even if we allow great weight to the motive of Reason. It does not seem to answer to the full experience of our consciousness.

I am inclined to admit this assertion, and to think that there is another activity concerned in the phenomena of Effort, and, perhaps, constituting its peculiarity, over and beyond not only the merely dynamic pull of opposing forces, but also the added motive of Practical Reason.

*A special Motive suggested.*

This motive, or activity, I would call the Will Motive, and define, as "having for its object the effectuation of

volitions"; and explain, as "whether of an Emotional Volitional or Rational Volitional character."

The existence of some such motive is recognised by Mr. Sidgwick (*Method of Ethics*, pp. 205-6). He says:—"We must include under it (*i.e.* the notion of Wisdom) the duty of adopting, after deliberation, the decisions of the Practical Reason: a duty perfectly clear and express. We should distinguish from this the more difficult excellence of adhering to rational resolves in spite of all gusts of impulse that the varying occasions of life may arouse; . . . and this virtue, by some such name as Firmness, is commonly recognised as an indispensable auxiliary to Wisdom. . . . We can, however, cultivate this excellence more directly and certainly than others, by graving our resolves deeper in the moments of deliberation that continually intervene among the moments of impulsive action." "Firmness was seen to lie in adhesion to resolutions formed after full deliberation, and refusal to change them without fresh deliberation."

Dr. Bain, in the 9th chapter of his *Mental and Moral Science*, treats of an emotion, called the "Emotion of Action or Pursuit." At page 228, he thus defines it:—"There are certain emotional situations arising under the action of Will. Besides the pleasures and pains of exercise, and the gratification of succeeding in an end, with the counter mortification of missing what is laboured for, there is, in the attitude of Pursuit, a peculiar state of mind, so far agreeable in itself, that factitious occupations are instituted to bring it into play. When I use the term Plot Interest, the character of the situation alluded to will be suggested with tolerable distinctness."

#### *Examination of Dr. Bain's explanation.*

I have read the chapter founded on this definition with great care, and find that the proper scientific description of the emotion referred to is the pleasurable feeling of accom-



plishing a volition, and the pain of failure. Now, as nearly all conscious life is made up of volitions; volitions to do; volitions to refrain from doing; volitions to repress, to coerce, to direct the attention, to accomplish every variety of object, surely this must be a very important emotion indeed, having most weighty and constant functions to fulfil in the mental life. Yet Dr. Bain, in his detailed treatment of it, speaks only of pursuit in field sports, contests, occupations of industry, sympathetic relationships, pursuit of knowledge, plot in literature, etc.

I do not know whether or no Dr. Bain would accept my definition of the emotion, namely, the emotion related to the accomplishment of volitions. Yet it seems to me that the accomplishment of volitions is recognised as the emotional object by Dr. Bain, but that his conception of it is not vivid, and is very inadequate to its importance. Let us, therefore, endeavour to form for ourselves a proper appreciation of its scope and power in human affairs. How often have we felt that a decision once taken, all doubts and contrary emotions that had retarded resolution have been rendered quiescent, have no longer been allowed to disturb the action, and the whole force of our nature has been concentrated in the accomplishment of our volition, without any further drawback or hindrance.

#### *Characteristic of the Motive.*

The general terms applied to this characteristic of human nature are resolution, firmness, obstinacy, fixedness of purpose, tenacity of will, unwillingness to change, perseverance, self-control, self-command, concentrativeness, etc., according to certain distinctions of application. The emotion, which may be variously termed the Emotion of Will, the Power of Self-Control, or the Motive for the accomplishment of Volitions, derives pleasure from the effectuation of volitions, and pain from failure.

How strong this emotion is in some men cannot fail to



be recognised. There are men who pride themselves on the fact that when they have once made up their minds to do a thing they accomplish their end at any cost. There is, in some, a certain bull-dog tenacity of purpose that holds on till the end. Such men will work on, and work on, and when necessary wait, but without forgetting what they have resolved to do. The object may be good or bad, but the emotion of accomplishment is the same, and often operates in a man even when the attainment of the object may have been so long delayed that it will in the meantime have lost its savour.

The terms applied to the absence of this motive, or rather to its weakness, in individuals, are vacillation, irresolution, discursiveness, want of purpose, weakness of character, unreliability, fitfulness, changefulness, subserviency, flexible-ness, incontinuity, etc.

Its existence, in proportionate strength, gives stamina or back-bone to the character; confers permanency to the course of action, and consistency to the conduct. Without it each motive as it meets with an attraction is apt to divert the attention and action.

As this Will Emotion is related to Volition as a whole, and as so much of Volition is made up of Choice, which is Rational Volition, it is enforcive of all Rational Volitions, and forms a very important feature in any phenomenon of deliberation, choice, and the subsequent carrying out of the formed resolutions.

But inasmuch as in all minds sometimes, and in a great number of minds usually, the Rational Volitional is not predominant, but the Emotional Volitional, then the Will Emotion attaches itself to the Emotional Volition, and renders it very powerful, so that in spite of all counter emotions, and of all considerations of the Practical Reason, it secures its gratification. The strong Will Emotion, combined with the Forcefully Emotional, is instanced in the avenger, in the conqueror, the insatiate of lust, the miser, the lover of splendor, etc.; in whom various passions assume inordinate proportions.

*The Will Motive in various combinations.*

If the great predominant motives of a man be of the group which aims at ambition, social position, and its concomitants, then the Emotion of Will restrains all other motives, as retarding accomplishment, and constrains the intellect and the body.

If the predominant motives be enjoyment, then the Will Emotion constrains the body and the intellect to its service, and constrains the reason to subtleties and casuistry to defeat itself, to cheat the conscience, and stave off the superior motives.

If the predominating motives be benevolent, or religious, or ideal (*i.e.*, relating to the perfectibility of society), then all other motives are over-ridden, and the moral and social enthusiast is produced; and if these motives are combined with definite intellectual convictions, such as theological dogmas, or schemes for social welfare, we have the religious persecutor, the tyrannical governor, the fanatic reformer, etc.

If the predominating motive be intellectual, as the pursuit of knowledge, collective or investigative, we have the student, or the man of science, or according to whatever special course the motive may take for itself.

*The Will Motive and Practical Reason.*

But as in the ordinary standards of humanity, reason and judgment have usually a fair influence, and some amount of choice is exercised, then the emotion of Will comes in as the ally of Reason. Deliberation is the consideration of the sequences of proposed actions with an estimate of their gratifications at various stages to the different motives, the resultant Choice not being agreeable perhaps to the motive that would receive immediate gratification, and the Reason perhaps not being strong enough to enforce its choice, receives aid from the Emotion of Will in the accomplishment of its resolution; and this action of the Emotion of Will, or



Self-Control, may be what we feel in the phenomenon to which we give the name of Effort.

A man, therefore, in whom Reason is predominant, accompanied by a naturally strong power of Self-Control, or Emotion of Will, guides his conduct mainly by Practical Reason. If he be of a good disposition also, that is, influenced by benevolence, the moral sense, etc., he is a useful member of society. If he possesses in a low degree the social feelings, he may become a man ruled by dogmas or beliefs, and may become capable of any cruelties. If he possesses some strong bodily appetite, or some powerful motives, or generally has a want of balance of motives, then great conflicts ensue; the Reason and the Will Emotion fighting against the irregularities; and with a greater or less degree of success does this go on for years and years, perhaps for a life-time, a conflict not unknown to humanity.

A man in whom Reason and Will Emotion are predominant, is more uncertain in action, in some respects, than those in whom certain motives are predominant. In the processes of development, men have acquired motives relating to definite external circumstances, which make them respond directly and immediately when those circumstances occur. The same result would take the man governed by pure reason a long time to think out, and the result being dependent upon a chain of reasoning (founded upon a set of supposed facts, in the appreciation of which he might be deficient), in the process of which mistakes might be made, the result might come out very wide of the mark indeed, judged by its further results. Indeed, it is doubtful if the pure intellect can appreciate motives, or that one man with a small emotion of a definite character can appreciate another who feels it greatly.

Speaking of a man wholly governed by Intellect and Will Emotion is speaking of a being that scarcely ever existed, but to which approximations have been made; and it is useful so to suppose a case, as it enables us to judge of the nature of the actions of those in whom it is predominant.



*The Will Motive and Self-Control.*

It may also be just and correct to consider the motive under our consideration as simple and direct, forming the desire for self-control. The desire for self-control, may thus be considered either a simple motive, or a compound one, composed of the Emotion of Power, the Will Emotion, and, perhaps, Reason, as an adjunct.

At any rate, the desire for self-control doubtless exists, and is founded in emotion or motive.

It is this which is so assiduously inculcated in the child and youth, and which is forced upon all of us, more or less, by circumstances.

A good degree of it is necessary for the regulation of the conduct, the pursuit of studies, and the attainment of ends. The youth and man afterwards carry on the educative process, and even adopt means, having the express effect of gaining a higher degree of self-control. Hence otherwise objectless rules of life, the practice of self-denial, self-discipline, etc., with the view of keeping the individual's powers "well in hand;" and hence the steady application and labour, in certain directions, with the view of increasing these powers, or some of them. The Indian undergoes an education in fortitude to become a warrior; the monk an education in asceticism to free himself from bodily passions. The reliance in all cases is upon this Emotion of Will, and according to the strength of this emotion is, as a rule, the degree of success.

*Summary.*

My summary, therefore, is this: There exists, as an emotional characteristic of the Practical Reason, the *desire* to adjust inner activities to outer conditions, which constitutes, so far as it is predominant, a rational life, and a *motive* for the accomplishment of resolutions founded on it.

But, in addition, there is also an emotion having for its object the effectuation of Volitions; and inasmuch, and in so far, as Volition is determined by the Practical Reason, that is

to say, to the extent of the phenomena of Deliberation, and Choice, and Resolution, so far this emotion combines with the Practical Reason for the effectuation of its resolutions.

This motive is like all other motives, derived by heredity, and exists in different individuals in different degrees, is capable of, and actually does receive education and cultivation, and by well-recognised processes may be attained in a higher degree by all. And, although I hold that it is not compatible with Automatism, I maintain that it is quite consistent with the Causational theory. That, therefore, the phenomenon of Effort, which it explains, is quite compatible with the Causational theory, which it was held to invalidate.

ON DR. CARPENTER'S OBJECTION THAT ON THE CAUSATIONAL THEORY THERE CAN BE NO RESPONSIBILITY OR BLAMEABILITY.

This objection rests upon the supposition that Choice and Effort are incompatible with the Causational theory; and as it stands or falls with it, and we have shewn that Choice and Effort are compatible with Causation, the objection naturally falls to the ground.

But it may be urged, that as my argument is admitted not to be universal in its scope, but that all that is claimed to be established is, that some men sometimes, or most men mostly, exercise Rational Volition, there are still great numbers who do not, perhaps cannot, generally exercise this power—what about them?

*The amount of the Power of Choice.*

In reply, I am willing to take the verdict of common sense (which is the concensus of opinion or experience), that where we now, as a matter of fact, in extent and degree, hold men responsible and blameable, so far do we deem them to have the power of Choice and Effort, and, therefore, capable of



Rational Volition; and I maintain that this common and general estimation of the extent of responsibility and of power of Choice is substantially correct, and a true measure of it. What that amounts to is upon consideration shewn to be very great. In fact, all but those who are deemed insane and are deprived of their liberty, are regarded as responsible for their actions. There are, of course, degrees of eccentricity, and states of mind, which border upon, but do not quite reach, insanity; or, men may be partially insane; in these cases there is a corresponding opinion about the degree of responsibility and blame. There are also degrees of estimation of culpability in the conduct of men and women in ordinary life, all founded on the degree of Choice, or Rational Volition, of which they are deemed capable. Sometimes, also, we make allowance in a charitable spirit for faults on account of an occasional lapse from duty. But with all these allowances there remains a large, a preponderating, extent of conduct, for which men are held to be responsible, and to that extent, I maintain, is the extent of the power of Choice and of Rational Volition possessed by men.

#### *Blame and Approbation Sympathetic.*

But, the question of responsibility and blameability opens out a very wide and complicated field of enquiry. It involves many other considerations besides that of the predominance of Rational Volition.

In the eye of reason the non-performance of a rational volition is a foolish or unwise thing only, and excites no further feeling, unless it be the disappointment arising from an ineffectual resolution, though this may perhaps be felt keenly enough.

But there are other considerations, more properly involved, peculiar and essential to approbation, blameability, and responsibility.

And, in the first place, in our feelings of approbation, we sympathise with those activities of others which we possess



ourselves ; and, unless they occur to our injury, we approve and are pleased with the contemplation of them. And, on the converse, we are indifferent to activities we do not possess, and disgusted with activities which are incompatible with and offend our own. The kind of feeling I would wish to indicate is the emotional pleasure or displeasure of contemplating activities with which we sympathise, and the converse, irrespective of blameability. As, for instance, the pleasure in seeing a kindly action performed, or contemplating a kindly character, the admiration of courage, and of an intellectual display. All these things appeal to activities within us, and afford them pleasure in contemplation. So I have noticed that there is a kind of approving sympathy between one drunkard, or convive, and another ; between one rogue and another ; and in courts of law, I have sometimes noticed marks of approval on the acquittal of a criminal who has by insufficient evidence escaped conviction, an approval, seeming to me, to come more from the sympathy of vicious feeling than anything else. But on the part of the pure and elevated there could be no such sympathy ; neither could there be such with regard to the gross eater or drinker ; neither could there be such in the contemplation of pigs or monkeys, but the reverse, namely, disgust. The wide field of personal sympathies and antipathies would supply endless examples.

*The natural feeling of Resentment.*

In addition to this natural feeling of sympathy, which would make men seek or avoid, express approval or disapproval of, other men, and which does not amount to blame, there is in man a natural feeling of resentment. I do not know whether to treat it as a higher degree of the anti-sympathetic activity of the special emotions, or to treat it as a separate activity ; this, however, is immaterial so far as our subject is concerned. There is such a feeling of resentment, and it is attached to those persons who perform actions that primarily hurt us, and secondarily, through sympathy,

hurt others ; and this hurt is a hurt either of our body, or of our emotions, and is felt in accordance with the degree of the force of the hurt in relation to the degree of the susceptibility. This resentment takes the form of hurting the person who has been the occasion of the hurt. This is the natural law of retaliation or retribution. Into the origin of it it is needless to go ; it is sufficient that it exists, and stands as a natural law of retribution. It corresponds to the natural law, or consequences of pain, arising from the infraction of physical laws, and forms the natural penal consequences of infractions of the natural moral laws, or established adjustment of emotions. It forms the basis of all ideas of retributive justice, codes of laws, punishments in the family, conduct amongst children, social penalties in society, the expression of forceful detestation, etc.

Let us see how this affects the argument that, as Causation extends over all human volitions, no human being should be visited with blame or punishment for anything he does.

*How it affects the argument as to Responsibility.*

The answer is very stale and commonplace, and both objection and answer appear constantly in the joke columns of provincial newspapers, dressed up in some grimly grotesque scene of judge and malefactor, and it is no less logically conclusive than funny. "If you committed this crime by causation, I condemn you by causation, and you have nothing left to say." And so, irrespective of any intellectual theories, those who hurt others in their bodies, or in their emotions, will, as long as man remains anything like what he is, receive the natural retribution of blame or actual punishment for their faults.

*The Rationalisation of Resentment.*

I do not know whether there is naturally a kind of due proportionment between the extent of the injury and the extent of the punishment ; probably it is so ; but, in any



case, the emotion of resentment, in common with all other emotions, comes within the purview of the reason. It becomes rationalised. Its *raison d'être* is recognised. Its place in the moral and social economy is perceived, and its ultimate object in furtherance of the aim of the Practical Reason, of the adjustment of activities with activities, and of activities with environment, is duly judged. Therefore it becomes regulated in its action, like all other emotions, to the rationalistic end, and while forming the accentuation of blame and punishment, and constituting its moral peculiarity as blame and punishment, and not merely the intellectual adjustment of ends to means, it is regulated and modified, so as to be conformable to those ends. And as the rationalisation of the activity of the emotion of resentment does not supersede that emotion, still less does it put it out of court on the ground of irresponsibility from Causation. But even if the influence of the emotion of resentment was altogether suppressed, which is conceivable; if the modern growth of the rationalisation of resentment in the publicly recognised objects of dealing with criminals, for purposes of the reformation of offenders and the prevention of crime by deterrent punishments, became predominant; there would, even without that feeling of blame and responsibility, be systems of punishment, and the consequent feelings of fear and caution and self-control which they would be intended to bring forth, would be educed all the same. So that, in any case, there would remain intact all those systems of social disapprobation, and legal punishments, which are necessary for the restraint of individuals in their selfish activities, and for the protection of society from criminals.

*The Causational Theory as affecting Accomplished and  
Contemplated Actions.*

The question, however, may take a personal form, and it may be asked, What is likely to be the effect of the Causa-



tional theory in the interior thoughts of individuals, in considering their own actions and conduct?

These considerations may be in respect of actions about to be undertaken, or already accomplished.

If of actions about to be undertaken, no man has a right to say that he is obliged to do some particular action. He may say afterwards that his action was caused, but he cannot say in advance that some particular action is necessary. He may certainly judge of his own character, and be able to predict with tolerable certainty what he will do. If it is a good man, contemplating a good action, it is well; but if it is a drunkard, considering, say, in a moment of temptation, about taking a glass of spirits standing before him, it is not well. Sometimes he will say, "I cannot help it," and I am prepared to admit that, as a matter of fact, there are men and women so born and so educated, born of depraved and vicious parents, inheriting diseased and drink-and-lust poisoned bodies, that seem inevitably doomed from the first to a vicious course of life, particularly if brought up in the surroundings of vice, drink, and prostitution, in the slums of our great cities, and there is very little help for them of their own origination.

But speaking of men of education, of moderately good bringing up, who possess a knowledge of duties, and capable of rational considerations, they have no right to say that some feeling must prevail over Rational Volition; and if they do say so, and give way, they must take the consequences. In such cases, it is well that the full extent of consequences should be realised by the individual in advance, in respect of direct punishment, in respect of consequences to others, in respect of deterioration of character, in respect of remorse, and it is well also that the full consequences should be visited upon him, either in law or in society, in order to keep up the general standard.

No man should feel that he cannot alter his own character. To the contrary there are various reasons. Firstly, the fact that men are constantly doing so, and have done so

in all ages. Next, that self-control is constantly and habitually practised by the great mass of the community to some extent, and by the individual himself to some extent, and what is possessed can be increased by the adoption of wise and judicious methods. Also, the great fact of education, by which the minds of children and youths are modified, testifies to the contrary; and the great processes of evolution show, on a large scale, what can be done on a small one. The whole facts go to show that by the adoption of suitable methods, of which not enough is known, nor the general necessity of which, in respect to ourselves, and in respect to one another, is sufficiently recognised, great changes of character and habit can be effected. But I am not now treating of the art of self-control, but of the case of a man's feeling that a contemplated action in contravention of a rational volition is unavoidable, and that he cannot change his character. And I argue that he has no right to say so.

In respect of accomplished actions, we have to do with satisfaction or remorse, or, more correctly, with the latter. Remorse is distinguished from sorrow and regret, in that the latter is applied to actions not within our control, whereas remorse is felt with regard to actions over which we had control, or think that we ought to have had. It is very poignant, and is made up of the pain of the Reason motive, the Will motive, and of those motives which have been outraged by the action, causing a high feeling of resentment, which can only be applied to one's self.

I do not see that the belief in Causation, as extending over all human volition, can do away with the feeling of remorse. It would perhaps cause us to extend to ourselves that degree of charity which we would extend to others, and prevent us dwelling morbidly and to excess upon our failures, and to some natures, such as that of Miss Martineau, which was disposed to be morbidly sensitive of the results of her actions, it might come with a healthy effect. It is quite possible for the feeling of remorse, resulting from every failure or mistake, large or small, to dwell so much upon a

mind as that it shall be continually weighed down, and repressed from attempting by fresh effort to regain its position, and from making further conquests in the government and control of its activities, or in the outer environment.

*Summary.*

This brings us to the conclusion of my consideration of the objections made by Dr. Carpenter to the Causational theory. This theory I have shown to be founded on a strict examination of mental and moral phenomena, with every one of which it is consistent, and I have answered all the objections brought against it on the ground of its being at variance with certain phenomena (*i.e.*, Choice and Effort), and on the ground of certain supposed evil consequences that could logically result to the individual and society.

It remains now to examine Dr. Carpenter's rival theory on its own exposition, on its own method of proof, and to see if it will stand the test of a strict criticism, or if, as I fear, it will tumble to pieces in our hands.



## PART II.—THE FREE WILL THEORY.

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### A CRITICISM OF DR. CARPENTER'S EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF FREE WILL.

This Essay would be incomplete without a consideration of the positive position held by Dr. Carpenter, and his reasons for holding it.

So long as a theory is expressed in loose and vague terms, it may, on the face of it, carry a certain amount of assent. But if the terms are reduced to definite meaning we often find that the statement of a theory contains within it the elements of its own dissolution. This, I think, is the case with Dr. Carpenter's exposition. His book is written in a free, effective sort of way, with a very confusing interchange of terms, many of which have different meanings, and some none at all, so that the assent given to one term is dovetailed into several others, and made to bear the burden of theories, comprehensible and incomprehensible, with which it has nothing to do.

The foundation of the theory advocated by Dr. Carpenter is in Consciousness, and what we are conscious of is expressed as follows:—"Freedom of choice," "volitional power," "self-determination of the Ego," "a self-determining power," "the Ego a Free Agent," "Free Will," and "The Will," "an Entity wherein man's nobility essentially consists."

#### EXAMINATION OF THE TERMS EMPLOYED.

In a former part of this Essay I had occasion to refer to the classification of human actions, and, although we were not able to lay down any exact line of demarcation, we found a certain principle, or the absence of it, to distinguish some actions from others; and that was the principle of Control,

or Coercion, by one activity over another, to effect definite action. Some actions are involuntary, and some volitional, and of the latter we distinguished two classes, viz., the Emotional Volitional, such as the immediate gratification of passion, etc.; the Rational Volitional, or actions undertaken for the accomplishment of co-ordinative purposes.

The word Volition may be applied to all human actions proceeding from the emotions or the reason, in which the phenomenon of Control or Coercion of the muscles, or of the attention, occurs; or it may be applied to the active state of the emotions or reason immediately preceding and co-existing with the action. To this active state may also properly be applied the word Will. Will is the volition for the time being.

The phrase "The Will" is a vicious term. It has two meanings. Properly speaking, it is the succession of volitions, or volitional states; *i.e.*, the successive predominances of motives in the Emotional Volitional, or of the Practical Reason. Whatever predominates for the time being is the Will for the time being, and the succession of volitions for a life-time forming an aggregate is "The Will" of a man; that is to say, the totality of his volitions. But it is often used as identical with one, or a combination, of human activities. The one with which it is more conspicuously identified is the Practical Reason. The combination with which it is identified is the Practical Reason, and what are regarded as the superior motives. That this identification of the Will with the Practical Reason is so often made is easily explainable on the ground that for the good of the individual, and of society, the Practical Reason ought to control, if not to govern, volition; and that it actually does so to a great extent. But, in order to avoid confusion, it is best not to employ the term in this way. Its proper meaning is the aggregate of volitions.

If Volition and Will are interchangeable terms, then the volition of the moment is the will for the time being. Yet Dr. Carpenter says, that "The Will" may be overborne



by strong and powerful motives, and the resultant action, or Volition, will be opposed to the Will; and Volition is, therefore, not Will. This apparent paradox is due to the loose employment of terms. Volition is the process of the resolution of motives or reason into definite action. The Will, for the time being, is the set of predominating motives or reasons. "The Will" of Dr. Carpenter refers to the set of motives belonging to the supra-cerebral entity, which ought to be called by a special and distinguishing name.

We come now to the adjectives employed in connexion with the word Will. One is power of will; another is weakness of will. These have a twofold meaning corresponding with the two meanings of the word Will, and indicate a greater or less degree of volitional force in action, in relation to obstructions, or in relation to the volition of other individuals, which is its proper meaning; or, to the greater or less predominance of the Practical Reason in an individual, in relation to his own motives and activities generally.

The application of the word Free to the word Will necessitates a preliminary study of the former word. It has only one meaning, and that is—unconstrained and unobstructed. A man is said to be free when his activities are unrestrained by the activities of other men. He is said to be not free when his activities are restrained, when he is put in prison, for instance. A higher degree of non-freedom is shown in constraint, as in a state of slavery, or in the power exercised by the strong over the weak, or in the management of young children sometimes. That which coerces, or restrains, is free; that which is coerced, or restrained, is not free. That which acts is free. Volition is action, or evidenced by action, and is, therefore, free; and all volition is free; and all men, at all times (except so far as limited by their own capacities, and restrained by the activities of others), exercise free volition. The volition is an evidence of its own freedom.

To say that a man who acts constantly under the predominating influence of some motive is not free to do as he



likes, but is a slave to that particular motive, is a mistake—he still does what he likes. That his reason may not approve may be true; but his reason is no more himself than this predominating motive. Amongst the interior motives, that which predominates is free; that which is restrained, or coerced, is not free; but the ultimate volition, being the action of the strongest, be it a passion, or be it the Practical Reason, is free; and life, being made up of volitions, the totality of them, namely, the human Will, is free.

To say that a man is a slave to a motive is, therefore, not a correct expression. It has a colloquial value, but not a philosophical one. It is not applied to all motives, as to benevolence, ideality, etc., but almost exclusively to the predominance of the passions and appetites, and, generally speaking, to their predominance in relation to the Practical Reason; but there is no reason whatever why it should not be equally applied to the superior motives, or to the Practical Reason.

It remains to examine the application of the word to Causation. The theory objected to is that states of activity are determined by previous states of activity, and, therefore, the denial of that theory which involves the use of the word Free must mean freedom from, or absence of, that uniformity of sequence. What is the meaning of Freedom from Causation? To translate the words, it means "absence of restraint or constraint" by means of "uniformity of sequence." But it seems to me that the first term is utterly inapplicable to the second, that it is as incongruous with it as it is to say red magnetism, or a blue scent, and all that is meant is absence of uniformity of sequence. It does not mean the absence of some definite and explainable power called Causation, but simply the non-uniformity of sequence. And if Free Will means freedom from Causation, it means non-uniformity of sequence, which is the question in dispute, and to which we shall recur.

But the phrase Free Causation is sometimes used. But

since Causation means uniformity of sequence, neither the words "free," nor "constrained," are applicable to it; and if the latter is admissible, I certainly do not see how the former can be, for the words seem contradictory in the intent and purport of their usage. All that is intended, however, in this case, as in the former, is to deny uniformity of sequence, which is the question in dispute.

The conclusion I come to is, that the word Free is of no use whatever in describing human volitions, or the interaction of human motives, and that it should be altogether discarded from the discussion. It has a correct social usage, but is of no philosophical value; on the contrary, it exercises a very misleading and mischievous influence.

There is another application of it, however, that requires a little attention, and that is its connexion with the word Choice, constituting Free Choice, of which we are said to be conscious.

I have previously explained Choice as the action of the Practical Reason, and I assert the consciousness of Choice as part of my mental experience as strongly as does Dr. Carpenter, Mr. Sidgwick, or any other advocate of Free Will. Consistently with my explanation of the word "free," I also hold, that when the Practical Reason is predominant, Choice is predominant, and that which is predominant is also "free"; so that whenever the Practical Reason is predominant, we exercise Free Choice. At the same time the word "free" is quite superfluous; the word "choice" is quite as correct, and of the same value without it.

So if it is asked, "Has man free choice?" The reply is, "Sometimes he has, and sometimes he has not." In proportion to the predominance of the Practical Reason (not in proportion to the predominance of the so-called superior motives) do men possess and exercise Choice, or Free Choice, or by a misnomer Free Will.

The term Free Agent scarcely calls for any remark. There does not seem to be anything of special meaning in the word "agent," but to be a loosely interchangeable



word for actor, being, etc., and the individual is free so far as he is unconstrained by others, and so far as his capacities go.

But we now come upon a term, or set of terms, which I find in favourite and constant use by Dr. Carpenter, and of which I cannot make anything; which seem to me to be utterly unmeaning, and, therefore, of great use in the exposition of a theory which cannot be explained. I refer to the term "Self-Determining Power."

It is not said that man *is* a Self-Determining Power. This in a rough sense might be comprehensible, and would be understood as distinguishing a man from a stone, and the higher classes of organised existences from the lower. It is said that man *has* a Self-Determining Power. It is, therefore, considered to be one of his activities. We can understand that it should be called a power in the same way as an activity may be called a power; as power of vision, power of thought, power of benevolence, etc. "Determining" is a word applied to the universal sequence of one set of phenomena to another, by which the power is said to "determine" the latter. Thus, applied to human activities, we find the commencement of the group of human activities constituting an individual is determined by the act of generation, followed by suitable physiological conditions; and the particular characteristics of those activities are "determined" by the law of heredity, afterwards followed by influences of environment, and these activities "determine" other internal activities and external phenomena.

Now, to say that any activity is "self" determining can mean only one or more of three things. Firstly, that its existence is not due to any precedent conditions. Secondly, its mode of activity and degree of power is not determined by any precedent conditions. Thirdly, its own activities have no regular order of sequence amongst themselves, and are not followed by any uniform sequences amongst other activities. We have to predicate of it self-existence, or specially created existence, unmodifiable modes of sequence,



and, at the same time, no modes of sequence, and not followed by any settled order of sequences.

This amounts again to a denial of uniformity of sequence amongst human activities ; but it also involves the predication of an activity not produced in the order of sequence, and whose modes of activity are not determined in any order of sequence, but which may or may not determine other sequences. To the discussion of the existence of such an activity, and the grounds for belief in it, we shall recur.

Fatalism. This is another unmeaning word. It may be of colloquial use ; but, of philosophic, none. It may refer to the involuntary part of a man's life, or it may refer to external circumstances beyond his control. But, to apply it to Causation is to identify it with Causation, and to take away from it any special meaning and make it useless. For a man to apply it to the past in saying, "It was my fate," etc., is simply to state facts that have occurred, the opening phrase being superfluous ; and to apply it to the future is nonsense. He does not know till afterwards what he is fated to do, if he wishes to use the word.

The use of the word is very curious. For instance, are the processes of reasoning fatalistic ? Is Euclid fatalistic ? Is the application of my reasoning powers in the consideration of the results of actions fatalistic ? and again, is the consideration of the activities of my own nature in their mutual relations, and are my conclusions in respect to them, fatalistic ?

Necessity. This also seems a very superfluous word. I can find no room for it in any description or investigation of the relations of phenomena. It seems to imply some old metaphysical notion now obsolete.

#### ON THE TESTIMONY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

That the testimony of Consciousness is valid is not disputed. The arguments in favour of the reliability of Consciousness are thrown away. The question is, What is

it that Consciousness really does testify? and What is the proper mode of finding it out?

*Mode of obtaining it.*

The mode advocated by Dr. Carpenter does not commend itself to me. Thus (p. 5) he speaks of "a positive conviction, which is felt by every right-minded man—who does not trouble himself by speculating upon the matter—that *he really does possess a self-determining power*, which can," etc.

At page xx. of the preface to the fourth edition, he also speaks of "the belief entertained by all men—except philosophers—in their own freedom of choice," etc.

Dr. Carpenter's argument is this: Every right-minded man has a positive conviction that he has a self-determining power (called in some places an Entity), distinct from the Thinking and Emotional Activities.

Those who have not this conviction, are not right-minded; those who have it are so, the possession of it being the test of right-mindedness.

But the testimony of the right-minded only is reliable; therefore only those who possess the conviction are competent witnesses, and everybody else must receive the testimony in silence.

But this conviction—this consciousness—is not an essential part of the mental constitution of a right-minded man; to have it he must not trouble himself by speculating upon the matter—like philosophers do—or else, like them, he may lose it.

If he does speculate, away goes the conviction. This is awkward. It is not usual for scientific men to place reliance upon first impressions, and to discredit the results of investigation.

Speculating here means investigating and examining, and I agree with Dr. Carpenter, that careful investigation does, very often, cause us to change our convictions, or interpretations, of first impressions; and very decidedly so in this case; but the verdict is rather in favour of speculating,



than of the right-mindedness which remains content with the crude expression of crude consciousness.

Between the normal man and the blind, in respect of consciousness of vision, it can be settled that one has a consciousness, an activity, or a power, which the other has not. If this is a parallel case to the one under consideration, between the man who is conscious of a Self-Determining Power, and the man who is not, it can also be settled, some men having it, some not, and some partially, and some perversely. But the conclusion arrived at does not pass away, but is confirmed by investigation.

Between the man who states that he is conscious of certain phenomena, and the man who states that he is not, there is a great gulf fixed. No amount of asseveration on either side can convince. If two great bodies of normally constituted men give different accounts of their consciousness in some particular respect, it is probable that the consciousness is the same, but that they differ in their modes of describing it by attaching different meanings to the words used; or that they mistake some unconscious inference for some immediate mode of consciousness. The only plan is for every one to endeavour to state as clearly and simply and uniformly as he can, what he does feel; to explain the words he uses, so that, by comparison and examination, an estimation of the nature of the points of difference shall be arrived at. The great fault in Dr. Carpenter's Work is that he does not give such a simple and uniform account of his Consciousness, or of the Consciousness of the right-minded—sometimes it is a consciousness of freedom of Choice, of Effort; sometimes of a Self-Determining Power, of absence of Causation, of an Entity, which, etc., so that I can only conclude that he has not troubled himself to speculate about it, or investigate it.

*What it testifies.*

My opinion as to what we are conscious of is Motive and Reason. I coincide with Dr. Carpenter in the



consciousness of Choice, and in the consciousness of Effort; but beyond that, I assert that neither he nor I have any consciousness in respect to the matter under consideration; that the other things of which he asserts Consciousness, so far as they have a meaning, are impossible as Consciousness, or else are inferences, and those erroneous ones, from actual modes of Consciousness.

In the first place, we include in our statement the knowing faculty, Consciousness is knowledge—self-knowledge—and it has to be spoken about in terms of phenomena, and not in terms of entity.

*We cannot know Entities, but only Phenomena.*

We only know phenomena, we cannot know anything called entities, except as somewhat permanent combinations of phenomena. We cannot speak of a power, or an activity, apart from the modes and relative degree of strength of its activities. Therefore, we cannot speak of a mysterious Power, or Entity, above and beyond its modes of manifestation; we can only speak of power or activities so far as they are known in activity. We may draw what inference we think due; but, as matters of Consciousness, we cannot be conscious of anything beyond modes of activities, and their likenesses and differences.

*We cannot be conscious of Non-Causation.*

Neither can we be conscious of Non-Causation, or the absence of precedent conditions, except as a matter of ignorance. Man was very early conscious of some uniformities of sequence, and afterwards became conscious of more. In the intermediate stage he was not conscious of, or, in other words, was ignorant of, the uniformities of sequence, of which he was conscious afterwards. His state was not a consciousness that these consciousnesses had no uniform precedents, and that such uniformity would never come within human experience, but

simply one of ignorance. He could have no such positive consciousness, only the negative one. So, in the present instance, men can have no positive knowledge of the absence of uniformity of precedents, but only a non-consciousness or ignorance of them. There can be no consciousness of Non-Causation.

To say that one is conscious of Non-Causation, is going beyond the simple modes of feeling and thought, to which only Consciousness can testify; it is the assertion of a consciousness of a highly abstract and complex proposition, which requires a great deal of careful thought to express and to understand, if that even is possible, and does not call forth a response in the consciousness of others.

I therefore hold that, as a matter of Consciousness, all that we can say is, that we are conscious of Choice and Effort, of motives and reasons. That these are perfectly compatible with the Causational theory, I have already endeavoured to show. All beyond this, I maintain, is inference, and becomes debatable on other grounds than Consciousness.

#### ON THE SELF-DETERMINING POWER.

But suppose we accept the existence of some power exempt from Causation, let us proceed, as Dr. Carpenter should have done, to find out where, in the chain of Causation, the break occurs, and the influence comes in that is not in the regular order of sequences.

#### *Where is the breach of Continuity of Sequence?*

Does this break occur in the nature of the activity—that is to say, in the fact of the activity itself being of no definite character, and not operating in a regular manner, but erratic and incomprehensibly varied? or is it in the origination of a power which thereafter acts conformably to its own laws?

#### *Is it that the Self-Determining Power has no definite Nature?*

It seems to me that this power or activity is not, and cannot be, of an erratic nature, *i.e.*, destitute of any definite



nature, any definite relation, that is to say, with regard to human volitions. For, if it were of such a character, its influence would be utterly regardless of consequences, utterly inconsistent, and in the highest degree erratic, unreliable, and various. It might make a man commit murder indiscriminatingly, give all his property away in the public streets, walk on all fours, or do anything in the world that fancy might suggest, however inconsistent with his natural character. It would amount simply to "chance." And the possession of such a power in a high degree would cause us to reckon a man as a peculiar sort of lunatic.

This power, then, must possess a definite character. Is it more than simply enforcive of volitions? If it is no more than enforcive of emotional or rational volitions, and these are determined in the regular order of sequences, then this power is regulated in its result by ordinary Causation.

But more is claimed for it—it is said to be selective. It selects amongst the motives *which* shall prevail, and it is to be inferred that what are called the superior motives have its preference.

We can only conclude, therefore, that the power in question is not of a simple character, but a complex one, made up of simpler constituents. It has a cognitive power, and motives in sympathy with some of the motives of the other part of the being, forming a kind of second organisation, having motives of its own. If it is selective, how can it select otherwise than according to its own motives? If it commands amongst the motives, how can it command except for the accomplishment of some purpose, and that a purpose which is desired, and that desire the desire of some motive? If it have no definite character, then it will equally select the murderous motive, or the lust motive, or the benevolent motive, and there is no assignable cause why it should give the preference to any motive.

We can only come to the conclusion, then, that this power must possess definite characteristics, or motives of activity, in relation to volition.



This, however, does not shew any breach of continuity of Causation. It is simply removing it a stage further back. We come upon a second organisation, possessed of motives, acting in a regular and methodical way. The break of Causation which we are seeking does not occur in the fact of the nature and modes of activity of the Self-Determining power being irregular and erratic, subject to no law.

*Is it in the origination of the Power?*

We are forced, then, to the supposition that the breach of continuity of Causation occurs in the origination of this power. At some certain point in the development of the individual he suddenly becomes endowed with this Self-Determining Power. The only possible suppositions are, that in the fixed order of things, some time after conception or birth, it comes to him as a fixed quantity (and not a variable quantity, as in that case the variations would be caused), but limited by the powers of the constitution. The second supposition is that it is specially created for each individual.

In the latter case, the amount or degree of it may vary—need not be a fixed quantity. If it is a fixed quantity, the consideration of it will be included in the consideration of the first supposition. If it is a varied quantity, it is conferred by the Creator, either *irregularly* and arbitrarily in respect of the individual, and irrespective of the moral, mental, and physiological constitution of the individual; or *regularly* in accordance with it. But if it is conferred regularly in accordance with it, then its constitution and action are conformable to those laws of Causation which produced that constitution; if irregularly, and quite irrespective of that constitution, then the fool or the idiot from birth may get it equally with, or even in greater degree, than the well-balanced constitution of the child born of good and healthy parents, and apparently of good natural disposition. And if it is supposed that it is thus conferred irregularly, by a creator, and that it is a power not possessed equally by every one, not attainable by natural methods, by ordinary modes of

Causation, *i.e.*, by education, then there is an end to the feeling of responsibility on the part of those who do not possess it, or do not think they possess it, and that chaos of irresponsibility is arrived at which Dr. Carpenter is so anxious to avoid.

But if it is a fixed and invariable quantity, derived causationally, or by creation, and possessed by every individual equally at some moment of his development, how does it stand in respect of his general constitution, derived by the ordinary modes of Causation, *i.e.*, by laws of heredity, training, education, variation by environment, etc.? There is a doctrine of limitations. All these laws are recognised. It is admitted that children possess definite natural constitutions, mental, emotional, and physical; that any child cannot be made into any man, but only modified or trained to a certain degree in a given direction. Some can only be trained in a very small degree, some—born idiots—scarcely at all. There is a limit of capacity in the mental, emotional, and physical qualities of every individual. But, according to our supposition, the Self-Determining Power is possessed by all, at some moment, in an equal degree, by the idiot child as well as by the healthy normal child, and thereafter all through life it exists in a latent form, but in equal degree of strength (for it is a fixed quantity and unaffected by Causation), throughout humanity, equally in the wise man and the fool.

#### *The doctrine of Limitations.*

But now comes in the doctrine of Limitations. It is admitted that volition is limited to capacity. A man who has lost the use of his legs may will to walk, but cannot. A man utterly tired out with bodily fatigue, or numbed by cold, may will to get up and walk, but cannot. So with the intellectual faculties, a man may will to learn some art, to perform some intellectual work, and be unable to do so by reason of the limit of natural ability in that particular direction. We can go a step further, and say that a man may



will to be benevolent, or something else, say malevolent, and his efforts are limited by his capacity in those directions.

Thus, if the individual possesses a definite constitution, with limits of capacity to his intellectual and reasoning faculties, to his various emotional activities, and to his physical capacities, and he also possesses a Self-Determining Power quantitatively equal with that of all other men, its mode of exercise must be limited by the strength of those other powers. And even if its acts, from sympathy with one of them more than another, tend to strengthen the power of those approved activities, there is a point, by reason of the limit of the natural capacity, beyond which it cannot go, and it simply amounts to reckoning those particular activities, so enforced, at a higher degree of power in relation to the strength of the other activities, and the result is altogether causational, or uniformly regular in the series of phenomena. Thus, in the case of a brutal man, with very little capacity for benevolent or other superior activity, the Self Determining Power only adds an additional force to them, and they are still inoperative by reason of the superior force of baser motives and passions.

These remarks apply more to emotional activities ; but if we proceed to consider the case of a great limitation of intellectual and reasoning faculty, the result is still more remarkable. The want of power to recognise suitable conduct, or to forecast the results of actions, is a very common deficiency, and it exists in degrees up to semi-idiotcy. On the supposition of all possessing an equal degree of this Self-Determining Power, the exercise of it is limited by the mental capacity of the individual, and if the reasoning faculties are not able to give a proper amount of reflection and deliberation, nor attach proper estimation of value and recognition of the nature of actions, the exercise of that Self-Determining Power must be very dependent.

If it is difficult to see in what way its activity can be different from the activity of those other activities by



whose limits its own activity is limited, so that we should almost predicate identity.

*Ranks as an ordinary natural activity.*

In any case, it is but an added force amongst them, acting regularly in given directions.

As such it takes its place as one amongst a set of activities, and acts according to its constant or occasional predominance amongst them. It counts as a factor in the constitution, and is resultive according to its relative degree of strength. And here we come again upon regular Causation.

This mode of reasoning reminds one of the futile speculations of the schoolmen. To such courses of thought are we forced when we have to maintain the existence of metaphysical entities. It is the place of Dr. Carpenter, and the advocates of the Free Will theory, to explain where and how in the breach of continuity of Causation the break occurs, and if they fail to do so, we must try and discover for ourselves what is involved in the theory of a breach of continuity. In trying to do so, we can only come to one or other of two conclusions, viz., that it occurs by divine interference, a perpetual miracle, when, of course, responsibility ceases, or by regular Causation, so to speak, in the establishment of a motive, of universal fixed quantity, which takes its place as a motive amongst others, and acts thereafter causationally.

Now what evidence have we of either of these? None whatever. The evidence is rather to the contrary. The evidence derived from every-day experience, and from a consideration of the great divergences of character in individuals, and the natural characters of children, all points the other way. And if we fall back upon Consciousness, our consciousness may tell us that we have certain emotions, and certain reasoning powers, but it cannot tell us that some of our volitions are not caused, nor that some of our emotions and reasoning powers are not caused.

We are forced into these speculations because we are

conscious of certain phenomena, viz., the phenomena of Choice and Effort, which we cannot understand as occurring in the chain of Causation. And to frame for ourselves some kind of explanation of them, in our impatience we invent fantastic theories properly indefinite and mysterious, so as to afford some sort of refuge for our ignorance. But they rest for their basis simply on the supposed necessity for a theory to fit, and not upon any positive evidence either of consciousness or reasoning. And as long as it can be shown that these phenomena of choice and effort are compatible with the Causational theory, we shall not feel the necessity of falling back upon fantastic inventions to account for them.

ON THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE SELF-DETERMINING POWER AS EXPLAINED BY DR. CARPENTER.

Having studied the power in question by *a priori* methods, let us now take Dr. Carpenter's description of its functions and see to what end it works.

At page 5, he calls it "*a self-determining power, which can rise above all the promptings of suggestion, and can, within certain limits, mould external circumstances to its own requirements, instead of being completely subjugated by them.*"

Subjugation by external circumstances seems to me to be rhetorical, and not correct. I suppose it means that if a man has failed in the accomplishment of an object he tries again, and he does so by virtue of the power in question. But I should think he would do so according to the strength of the attracting motive, and according to a review of the chances of success; possibly the desire for the accomplishment of a volition might be a constituent motive. Or, Dr. Carpenter may call a strong temptation an external circumstance; but it is also an internal one, due to man having the emotion to be gratified. In this case the power enables him to overcome the promptings of suggestion—say to go into a public-house. To analyse motives in a supposititious case



is difficult, but, I presume, the reason why a man resolves not to go into a tempting public-house could be easily explained on natural grounds, though variously in different cases, and I have heard it done at temperance meetings, as thus:—"I will surely get drunk; I know I cannot stop when I begin; I shall spend all my money; they are low fellows there; what will my wife think of me? my children, again?"—and he does not go in.

At p. 9, "that *internal* power, by the exertion of which each individual becomes the director of his own conduct, and so far the arbiter of his own destinies."

There is no objection to this sentence, referring as it does to the influence of reason in the human constitution, except this, that the influence is referred to a mysterious entity called the Self-Determining Power—and put out of the line of Causation.

At p. 25, "But the power of the Will is exerted in the *purposive selection*, from among those objects of consciousness which sensations from without and the working of the internal 'mechanism of thought and feeling' bring before the Ego, of that which shall be determinately followed up." This also refers to the operation of Deliberation, the reasoning operations which it involves, and the intellectual appreciation of motives and the results of actions.

The intellectual nature of the processes involved in the Self-Determining Power is exhibited in the following quotation:—

"And thus in proportion as our will acquires domination over our automatic tendencies . . . our character and conduct in life come to be the expression of our best intellectual energies, directed by the motives which we *determinately elect* as our guiding principles of action." "Determinately elect" does not mean that the election is determined by motives and reasons, as is really the case; but "select after deliberation," or "choose"; and is a process of reasoning, taking into account the nature of the individual and the nature of the environment, to decide



upon the fittest course of action between them. The power to carry out that course of action depending upon the power of the reason motive, and the motive for the effectuation of volitions, and the balance of power of motives directly affected for or against such a resolution.

At p. 16, voluntary actions are described as "those which are called forth by a distinct effect of Will, and are directed to the execution of a definite *purpose*."

P. 27, "the actions of our Minds, *in so far as they are carried on without any interference from Will*, may be considered as 'Functions of the Brain.' On the other hand, in the control which the Will can exert over the *direction* of the thought, and over the *motive force* exerted by the feelings, we have the evidence of a new and independent power, which may either oppose or concur with the automatic tendencies, and which, according as it is habitually exerted, tends to render the Ego a *free agent*." Here the term Will is not applied to volition, nor to the totality of volitions, but is used as the name of the Self-Determining Power, and is described as concurring with or opposing the natural motives, but how otherwise than by having constituent motives of its own is not said. But evidently it *selects* amongst motives, and it *directs* in the formation of resolutions and to the accomplishment of them. The question then arises—Can it do so in any different way than by reasoning about them, namely, considering the relation of the activities and the environment, and comparing the circumstances of the case with the others of previous experience, and with convictions, and forecasting the consequences of different modes of action?

Dr. Carpenter gives a great variety of phrase and description in his exposition of the nature of the influence exercised by the so-called Will; but, on analysis, they all resolve themselves into the exercise of Choice; and, in the Preface to the 4th edition, he makes use almost exclusively of this word; "free choice," he calls it, if "free" can add anything to the meaning. He expresses this thought more clearly in an approved quotation from Mr. Sidgwick:—"It is im-

possible for me to think (p. 51), in the moment of deliberate volition, that my volition is completely determined by my formed character and the motives acting upon it. The opposite conviction is so strong as to be absolutely unshaken by the evidence brought against it. I cannot believe it to be illusory. . . . No amount of experience of the sway of motives even tends to make me distrust my intuitive consciousness, that in resolving after deliberation I exercise free choice as to which of the motives acting on me shall prevail. Nothing short of absolute proof that this consciousness is erroneous, could overcome the force with which it announces itself as certain ; and I cannot perceive that such proof has been given."

The whole stress here is laid upon the consciousness of Choice, and Choice is identified with "resolving after deliberation." Deliberation is a complex intellectual process. It is the weighing of different probabilities as to the eventualities of actions, and the advantages and disadvantages to each particular motive. It includes, also, an estimation of the motives, and a consideration of the degree of gratification that should be accorded to each of them, in respect to the good of the whole. In this explanation I give a very abstract meaning to the word motive, as inclusive of all desires, affections, principles ; everything, in fact, that is a mode of thought or feeling.

This, so far, is a purely intellectual process ; but deliberation and its results may not be so *purely thought out*. It may be biassed by predominant motives, when the deliberation is simply—How shall I best accomplish my gratification with the least drawbacks in the way of pain to my other activities ?

In a former part of this Essay I treated of this subject, and came to the conclusion that Choice, as distinguished from the unreflective predominance of motives, is the exercise of the Practical Reason ; and if I made out my case, all this solemn asseveration of the consciousness of Choice is an asseveration on the part of Mr. Sidgwick, Dr. Carpenter, and others,



of the predominance, in their mental constitutions, of the Practical Reason which all do not possess in an equal (inherited or educated) degree, and with whose declarations not everybody would be able to join.

The great point I seek to establish in this section of my Essay is that the functions of the Mysterious Power, call it by what name you will, as described by Dr. Carpenter, are identical with the natural functions, as we know them, of the reasoning faculties of the human mind, and of concurrent executive motives. If this identity is established, or capable of being established, all the phenomena upon which he lays the burthen of the mysterious Self-Determining Power are quite explainable in a natural way, and in the regular order of sequence. That such an identity can be established will be acknowledged by any one who reads through Dr. Carpenter's Work, from which I could extract numerous passages, but that I would overburthen this Essay with quotations.

ON THE SELF-DETERMINING POWER, EXPLAINED BY  
DR. CARPENTER, AS SUBJECT TO LAWS.

But the most singular part of Dr. Carpenter's exposition of the Free Will theory is his description of the variations of the Self-Determining Power, from which it would appear that it is subject to laws *in every respect* the same as any other human activity. And yet it is independent and self-determined.

*The Law of Heredity.*

It is subject to the law of heredity to begin with; as, for instance, (xlvi.) "Whatever allowances society may be ready to make for individual cases—such, for instance, as that of Hartley Coleridge, who was the victim of strong hereditary predisposition, accompanied by a constitutional weakness of will, it recognises, as a fixed condition, that the incipient drunkard has a power over himself, etc.; that *he can not only abstain*



*when he chooses, but that he can choose to abstain because he knows that he ought to do so."*

But if the principle is admitted of individuals being victims "of strong hereditary predispositions, accompanied by a constitutional weakness of will," why do we confine our allowances to such few cases of great genius, or otherwise, which specially excite our sympathies, and not extend it to all those—a multitude, in fact,—who are born with strong hereditary predispositions and constitutional weakness of will. However, that is not the question. The point is, that men are so born, and that the Self-Determining Power exists in men in degrees of strength relative to the other activities, and this degree of strength and relation to other activities is determined by heredity.

Dr. Carpenter maintains the principle of heredity and the hereditary transmission of acquired tendencies (368-375), including bodily characteristics, modes of nutrition, nervous organisation, psychical character, special mental aptitudes, etc.; but he does not treat directly of the Will. This is only admitted incidentally, as in the case just quoted, and others. Thus, speaking of the degradation of race, caused by habits of intemperance, he quotes Dr. W. A. F. Browne to this effect:—"The drunkard not only injures and enfeebles his own nervous system, but entails mental disease upon his family. His daughters are nervous and hysterical, his sons are weak, wayward, eccentric, and sink under the pressure of excitement of unforeseen exigency, or the ordinary calls of duty." "How small is their own moral responsibility for errors which are mainly attributable to the faults of their progenitors."

At page 374, the hereditary transmission of special mental aptitudes is distinctly taught, and the tendency of fully-established habits to become constitutional, and, therefore, transmissible; but it would appear that he is speaking only about man's "ordinary nature," and not his extraordinary one. But in pages 134-6, Dr. Carpenter seems to admit that from the earliest moments of child-life there is observable marked constitutional differences between

children in respect of Will-power ; and, at page 426, speaking of low-class natures, he says, "Of this latter class there are some, who, from original constitution and early influences of the most degrading kind, are altogether destitute of anything but a *brutal* nature ; these ought to be treated as irresponsible beings, and, as such, restrained by external coercion from doing injury to society." Further, at page 427, "There is *negative* type of character again, on which the wiser educator finds it difficult to make any permanent impression, through constitutional want of Self-Determining Power," thereupon explained.

From all this it clearly appears that the Self-Determining Power is constitutional ; it exists in different degrees in different individuals, and is transmitted to new constitutions in different degrees. In the Preface to the 4th edition, Dr. Carpenter says, "I fail to find, then, in any of the modern developments of physical or physiological science, any adequate grounds for abandoning the position maintained in the following Treatise, as to the direction and control to which the automatic activity of man is subject *in proportion to the development of his volitional powers*, that is, *the power exerted by the Ego, not only with a distinct purpose, but with a consciousness of effort, the strength of which is a mark and measure of its exercise.*" The italics in this case are mine, and the last clause should read, "the exercise of which is a measure of its strength," at least so it seems to me.

Again (Preface l. and li.), "Omniscience alone can rightly assign the moral responsibility of each individual for his several acts ; the degree of responsibility being determined (as in the cases cited under the last head) *by the proportion which his Will or self-regulating power bears to the strength of the dominant motives* by which he is urged in each case. This ratio, as already shown, will be a 'general resultant' of the whole previous course of life ;\* every exercise of

\* At the age of one month, six months, one year, two, three, four, and up to say when—threescore and ten ?



the Will increasing its vigour and controlling efficiency ; while every weak concession to a dominant passion tends to make the individual its slave.\* And thus a man or woman may come at last so far to have lost the power of self-control† as to be unable to resist a temptation to what is known to be wrong, and to be therefore morally irresponsible for the particular act ; but such an individual, like the drunkard in the commission of violence, is responsible for this irresponsibility, because he *wilfully abnegated*‡ his power of self-control by habitually yielding to temptations which he knew that he ought to have resisted.

I only intended to quote the first part of this paragraph, but the latter part is so curiously inconsistent with it, I could not forbear giving the complete passage. In the former, man's self-control is put down to the natural predominance of Will-power, and irresponsibility is claimed for those who act from a preponderance of other motives ; whereas, the action of these in the latter part is called " wilful abnegation " of the power of self-control, and responsibility is imposed. It would be desirable to know how the theories of responsibility from wilful abnegation, and irresponsibility from constitutional predominance of motives, are reconcilable with each other, and at what particular moment the former occurs.

The former part is corroborated by the succeeding sentence, " no one can fully estimate the *relative potency* of heredity and environment, on the one side, and the sense of duty and capacity of willing, on the other " ; as if sense of duty and capacity of willing, were not hereditary, and yet had an existence in the individual in a relative degree of potency with other activities.

The italics in these two quotations are my own.

### *The Laws of Education and Development.*

But greater stress still is laid upon the Law of Education.

\* The law of development by exercise and the converse.

† If gained, that is to say, as the " general resultant " of the whole previous course of life. See note above.

‡ When ?



While the limit of natural powers is maintained, the value of training from the earliest age is strongly inculcated (134-6); and speaking of the class of street arabs, Dr. Carpenter says: "The experience of those who have undertaken the work of Juvenile Reformation, has satisfied them that the cases are few, if any, in which there is not 'a holy spot in the child's heart,' on which an impression may be made by appropriate suggestions; and that by following the method of the good nurse (§ 269), the power of Self-Control, which seems, in the first instance, altogether absent, may be awakened and cherished; the lower propensities repressed by a judicious mixture of restraint and distraction, and the higher tendencies called by the genial warmth of sympathy into full activity."

At p. 9, the Educator "who really understands his profession will make it his special object to foster the development, and to promote the right exercise, of that *internal* power, by the exertion of which each individual becomes the director of his own conduct, and *so far* the arbiter of his own destinies." "Until this self-directing power has been acquired, the Character *is* the resultant of the individual's original constitution, and of the circumstances in which he may have been placed; and so long as the circumstances are unfavourable to its development, and to the operation of those higher tendencies which should furnish the best motive to its exercise, so long the Character of the individual *is* formed *for* him rather than *by* him." Dr. Carpenter goes on to argue about the non-responsibility of those who have not acquired this power.

In this phase of the exposition, it would almost seem that the power referred to was not included in original constitutions derived by heredity, but to be altogether an acquisition. Acquired, how? By training, by influence of circumstance, afterwards by self-training. Altogether a matter of the Law of Education by tuition and external circumstances, matters wholly beyond the control of the individuals.

The development of the power of the Will by exercise, and its disintegration by non-exercise, is insisted upon very strongly throughout the Work. Speaking of its control of the Intellectual Faculties, it is said to be a power (p. 388) "eminently capable of cultivation by steady intention of mind and habitual exercise," and is inculcated, in various places, as capable of attaining great strength, by exercise, over the moral conduct. In this respect, also, it conforms to general physiological and mental and moral laws.

At p. 27, we find, "It may be freely admitted, however, that such thinking automata *do* exist; for there are many individuals whose Will has never been called into due exercise, and who gradually or almost entirely lose the power of exerting it, becoming the mere creatures of habit and impulse."

"The strength of this Power (p. 366), which we term *Will*, mainly depends upon the *constancy with which it is exercised*; the ascendancy of *principles* of action determinately adopted by the Reason, over the strong *impulses* of passion or desire, being only possible when that ascendancy has been *habitually* maintained, and this not only in the ordinary course of conduct, but in the government of the thoughts."

In addition, then, to the operation of the law of heredity, in respect of the Self-Determining Power, it is subject also to the laws of education, variation by environment, exercise, etc.

#### *Dependence upon Bodily States.*

A striking instance of the dependence of the activity of the Self-Determining Power upon Causational conditions, as presented by Dr. Carpenter, is in respect to the absorption into the system of alcohol and other stimulants. Not only is the exercise of this Self-Determining Power temporarily affected by it, but a continuance of habits of intemperance, as before pointed out, affects the general exercise of it, and also the permanent character of the individual, in weakening the power of his will. The general dependence of the exercise



of this power on bodily states and bodily development is also recognised in the Work, just the same as all the other mental activities.

To summarise Dr. Carpenter's description of the Self-Determining Power, it would appear that it is transmitted by heredity, and in different degrees of power or activity in accordance with laws, more or less known, as one of the constituents of the nature of the newly-born infant. That it differs in degree of power in different individuals, and in each individual in proportion to his other transmitted activities. That it very early comes into connexion with an environment by which it is more or less called into exercise, and in proportion to the due amount of that exercise does it develop and strengthen itself. The first main influence is that of tuition by nurses, and then by parents and elder people generally, afterwards by tutors, followed up in a completed course by the recognition of the importance of the power on the part of the individual himself, who, thereupon, enters upon a course of self-imposed training, for the purpose of its further development. The influence of circumstances is also recognised, there being some positions in early life that are favourable to the growth of self-control, and other circumstances that are not so favourable. Finally, its dependence upon bodily states and bodily developments is also acknowledged.

The conclusion, therefore, is that whatever the Power may be that is spoken about, it is part of the regular order of Causation. There is no break in the order of sequences, and the whole order of its manifestations coincides exactly with the order of all the other mental, moral, and physiological activities of mankind.

#### DEVELOPMENT AND NECESSARY TRUTHS.

I confess I am quite unable to realise the position of Dr. Carpenter, who can thus maintain two such contrary doctrines as that Causational one which I have just

put together by means of extracts from his own book, and that Mysterious Power which he seems to place out of the regular order of sequences, and which, therefore, he praises so much and so continually.

I can only take refuge in his theory (p. 397). "Thus, then, while no one, *constituted as he is at the time*, may be able to help *giving* his assent to certain propositions, and *refusing* his assent to others, everyone who has learned to direct his own intellectual activity is responsible for the use he has made of his power, in the *construction of that mental fabric*, the aptitude or inaptitude of which, for the reception of a new proposition, determines his acceptance or rejection of it;" and (p. 409) "Our capacity for apprehending truths of the first order depends entirely upon the constitution of our own minds, and must necessarily be, like it, *progressive*. And for this view we have ample historic confirmation in the fact, that many propositions, formerly universally accepted as 'necessary truths,' are now no less universally abandoned as untenable or even absurd; whilst, on the other hand, we now accept as 'necessary' many propositions which our ancestors would have scouted as preposterous."

Does not this admission of the change and development of "necessary truths" imply also the change and development of what is conceivable and inconceivable, and also of the direct affirmations of consciousness? If so, the whole groundwork of Dr. Carpenter's argument is cut away.

#### RECAPITULATION.

To recapitulate the whole of my criticism of Dr. Carpenter's exposition of the Free Will doctrine, I find—

1. That the terms used, though of different meaning, are used interchangeably, causing a great confusion of statement, also that some are wrongly applied, and some have no meaning at all.

2. That the argument from Self-Consciousness fails—Firstly, on account of the viciousness of the terms employed.




Secondly, because it is said to be a Consciousness of a Power apart from its phenomena, which is impossible ; or a Consciousness of Non-Causation, which is impossible. Thirdly, because it necessitates a theory of a breach of Causation which cannot be proved, and can scarcely be put into comprehensible statement.

3. That the phenomena said to be characteristic of the Power in question, when examined, are discovered to be the phenomena of recognisable natural activities, namely, the Reason, and the motives relating to the execution of Volitions, and are all explainable by the Causational theory.

4. That in any case an examination of the Power in question, as described by its advocate, proves it to be identical with every other human activity, that is to say, it is derived Causationally, developed Causationally, and acts Causationally.

5. That the admission of change and development of necessary truths seems to me to do away with the sole reliance of the theory of a "Self-Determining Power."





## APPENDIX.

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MR. BRADLEY ON THE VULGAR NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE THEORIES OF FREE WILL AND NECESSITY.—(*Ethical Studies, Essay I.*)

### A CRITICISM.

THIS Essay is not an analysis of Responsibility, nor does it enquire if Responsibility implies either Necessity or Freedom, or, more properly, Determinism or Non-Determinism. Nor does it attempt to settle the Free Will controversy. It is a threefold undertaking to ascertain, firstly, what the vulgar mean by Responsibility; to consider, in the second place, whether either of the doctrines of Freedom or Necessity agree with their notions; and, lastly, in case they do not agree, to enquire in what respects these doctrines are incompatible with common opinion.

The vulgar notion of Responsibility is found to contain—1st. The idea of a man's answering for what he has done, or neglected to do, before a moral tribunal of some sort, to which it is *right* that he should be subject. This involves continuance of personal identity, and that the act is the act of the self that wills. 2nd. The opinion that a certain amount of intelligence, or "sense," is a condition of Responsibility. 3rd. The belief that no one is accountable who is not capable of knowing the moral quality of his acts.

The second and third points are not, however, discussed in the course of the Essay. The result of a consideration of them would seem to me to show that the vulgar opinion would coincide with the Determinist view, *i. e.*, that the conditions of the possession of sense and the capacity to judge of the moral quality of actions are due to heredity and education.

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The first step is to see how these notions under the first head agree with the so-called Free Will doctrine. On inves-

tigation it is found that up to a certain point they harmonise with it very well ; but when we come to examine the Free Will doctrine critically—

We must therefore ask, not what the Free Will theory is *not*, but what it is. What *is* then liberty of choice? "Self-determination. I determine myself to this or that course." Does that mean that I make myself do the act, or merely that my acts all issue from my will? "Making is not the word, and very much more is implied than the latter. You are the uncaused cause of your particular volitions." But does not what I am come from my disposition, my education, my habits? "In this case certainly not. The ego in volition is not a result, and is not an effect, but a cause simply; and of this fact we have a certain and intuitive knowledge." Or, if we express the answer in a different metaphysical language, it amounts to this: "The I is an universal, which has the power to abstract from all its particulars, and to suspend itself over them, before in choice it takes any one of them into itself, so as to realise that one, and itself thereby. This I, in the act of 'I will,' is the self, as pure I, which is superior to all its contents, desires, etc., and descends into them only by its own *libertas arbitrii*."

In this bearing, Free Will means Non-determinism. The will is not determined to act by anything *else*; and, further, it is not determined to act by anything *at all*. Self-determination means that the self, the universal, *may* realise itself by and in this, that, and the other particular; but it also implies that there is no reason why it should identify itself with this one, rather than with that one; there is not rational connection between the two sides; there is nothing in the self which brings this, and not that, act out of it. Turn it as we will, the *libertas arbitrii* is no more at last than *contingentia arbitrii*. Freedom means *chance*; you are free, because there is no reason which will account for your particular acts, because no one in the world, not even yourself, can possibly say what you will, or will not, do next. You are "accountable," in short, because you are a wholly "unaccountable" creature.

We can not escape this conclusion. If we always can do anything, or nothing, under any circumstances, or merely if, of given alternatives, we can always choose either, then it is always possible that any act should come from any man. If there is no real, no rational connection between the character and the action (as the upholder of "Freedom" does not deny there is between the actions and the character), then, use any phrases we please, what it comes to is this, that volitions are contingent. In short, the irrational connection, which the Free Will doctrine fled from in the shape of external necessity, it has succeeded only in reasserting in the shape of chance.

The theory was to save responsibility. It saves it thus. A man is responsible, *because* there was no reason why he should have done one thing, rather than another thing. And that man, and *only* that man, is



responsible, concerning whom it is impossible for any one, even himself, to know what in the world he will be doing next; possible only to know what his actions are, when once they are done, and to know that they might have been the diametrical opposite. So far is such an account from saving responsibility (as we commonly understand it), that it annihilates the very conditions of it. It is the description of a person, who is *not* responsible, who (if he is anything) is idiotic.

The Essayist, however, states that he is not investigating the truth of this hypothesis, but only wishes to see how it harmonises with vulgar notions, and proceeds to show how, up to a certain point, the vulgar man would agree with the apostle of Freedom; but when the latter states the argument fully, and explains what such freedom of choice must mean, and that before a man acted it was never certain how he would act, he would be met by the reply, "That depends on what sort of a man he is." This argument is further cleverly elaborated, the result being, that the theory of Non-Determinism is not found to agree with vulgar notions.

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The consideration of "prediction" of character and actions is then taken up in connection with both theories.

The strict interpretation of the doctrine of Freedom is that *no* actions can be predicted; the plain man believes that at least *some* actions can be predicted with tolerable certainty; while the necessitarian affirms that, given the data, *all* our actions could be foretold beforehand.

But, at this point, the upholder of Liberty may threaten summarily to destroy us. "Let my theory be as false," he may say, "as I, on the other hand, am sure that it is true, yet about one thing there is no disputing. If human actions can be predicted, then responsibility is unmeaning; and the ordinary man, confused as he may be on other points, sees this well enough, and will tell you so if you ask him."

If this were so, it would be waste of time to enquire any further, but I think it is not so; and, before we embarrass ourselves with exposition or criticism of necessitarian doctrine, it is necessary to get what light we can on the matter.

It is a fact that the plain man objects to the prediction of his actions; and, if it is a fact, does the objection apply to all, or only to some? If he objects in some cases only, where does he not object, and where does he? And further, why does he object? What is the ground that underlies his objection? These questions must be answered, and they are not easy. It is hard to get the facts, and hard to interpret them; but I hope to suggest to the thoughtful reader what, if new to him, may be worth his consideration.



There are some predictions which the vulgar man finds unobjectionable; there are others, however, which he objects to.

The ordinary man would probably be little short of horrified to find that the whole of his history, everything which has gone to settle his character, every element in the evolution which has made him what he is, had been foretold in detail before his birth. If I am right, he would be inclined to say, "The growth of my character has been predicted when I was not; and how then can I have had anything to do with it?"

It is not, however, the prediction which offends,

But what he was horrified at was to find the qualities of his being, deduced from that which was not himself. He can not bear to see the genesis of himself, or his self in becoming.

I have asked several "plain men" if this is so, and cannot find that they are very much shocked, and they do not understand a great deal that is put in their mouths by writers. Besides that, they do not all agree amongst themselves.

But, again, it is the prediction which offends—the rational prediction—

And so . . . it is not the *irrational* prediction of his doings which disquiets him, but rather, and very much more, the *rational*.

By "rational" prediction I mean the calculation beforehand, by certain laws and from given data, of a definite result. . . . By "irrational" prediction is meant the foretelling without a ground or a reason why.—  
*Note p. 17.*

However, the offence taken by the vulgar man is said not to be in "the prediction of his character with its actions," but in finding the qualities of his being deduced from that which is not himself; yet in this passage the horror is retransferred to the rational prediction.

What is the ground of objection to rational prevision (always apart from knowledge of character)?

Are we to understand that it is the prediction which is objected to, or the actual deterministic process?

Here we are bound to ask who is supposed to be making the prediction? Would it not have to be by an Omniscient Being before a man's birth? Yet the question here seems to be limited to the prediction by one man of another. But, after all, the question, as put, is not very comprehensible. "What is the ground of objec-

tion to rational prevision (always apart from knowledge of character)?” Does it mean, apart from “prediction” of a man’s character? or apart from the knowledge of the character of a man? But it is stated that neither of these is found objectionable by the vulgar man, if predicted by Omniscience. For “man feels no pain that God knows his inmost being.”

It is said that on the necessitarian doctrine, given all the data, all our actions could be foretold beforehand. This means, that being omniscient, one would know everything.

However, on following the Essayist, we find again that the root of the objection is—

For such prediction is, in a word, the construction of himself out of what is not himself; and that, as we saw, he can not understand. If, from given data and from universal rules, another man can work out the generation of him like a sum in arithmetic, where is his self gone to? It is invaded by another, broken up into selfless elements, put together again, mastered and handled, just as a poor dead thing is mastered by man. And this being so, our man feels dimly that, if another can thus unmake and remake him, he himself might just as well have been anybody else from the first, since nothing remains which is specially his. The sanctum of his individuality is outraged and profaned; and with that profanation ends the existence, that once seemed impenetrably sure. To explain the origin of a man is utterly to annihilate him.

We observe in this passage that—1. “Prediction” is said to be “construction.” I do not see how one word can be changed into the other; prediction certainly is not construction. And since prediction implies an intelligence, who is the intelligence? 2. “The construction of himself out of what is not himself,” which he cannot understand. Construction implies a constructive intelligence; who is the intelligence. Should we not rather say “developed” out of that which is not ourselves? and do we understand it? and, in any case, are we offended? 3. “If, from given data and universal rules, another man can work out,” etc. Is it ever supposed that another *man* can occupy such a position, and that, to occupy such a position, he remains man? Can our Essayist give an instance of one man ever treating another in the unceremonious manner he describes? To occupy such a position is to occupy the position of God; and it is stated, a little further on, that “man feels no pain at the thought that God knows his inmost being; . . . the self loses sight of its private selfishness, and



gives itself up, to find itself and more than itself." It seems to me that the objection made to imperfect human prediction, as stated above, is only applicable in its full force to the perfect prediction of omniscience—yet this is found unobjectionable. The latter part of this sentence is incomprehensible—how does self give itself up? how does it find itself? 4. But for a man (to frame an impossible supposition) thus to predict another man's life and character, is profanation. "The sanctum of his individuality is outraged and profaned; and with that profanation ends the existence that once seemed impenetrably sure." Now, is the existence of a man ended by the fanciful supposition that another man can make and unmake him? and what is the nature of the process? Again, to be hypercritical, perhaps, how can a man feel that he might just as well have been any body else from the first, since nothing remains which is specially his? This wants a great deal of explanation. Again, this is very incomprehensible. "To explain the origin of a man is utterly to annihilate him." In the first place, what does "to explain" mean? to explain anything does not amount to very much, with our limited knowledge and capacity. To explain the origin of life, however much we can explain its phenomena in relation to other phenomena, is impossible to us; and what we do explain we certainly do not annihilate. So that it does not seem that if we could explain the origin of a man we could annihilate him.

We would ask here, What does the "man" include which is thus annihilated? I cannot but think that the Essayist does not do justice to his theory in his mode of expression, and I submit these criticisms as showing the difficulties of apprehension by the ordinary mind, and the necessity for an exposition suited to the understanding of those who only receive the words of the English language in their ordinary meaning.

But the objection is stated in another form; at p. 19 it is called "The objection to the rational development of character." There is such a process as the rational development of character, but it is something very different from the subject under discussion, and I suppose all that is meant is the rational prediction of character, which is before erroneously stated as unobjectionable by the Deity, but objectionable in its entirety (which is also impossible) by man.

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But now a movement in the discussion takes place, and

If we come now to belief in responsibility, and ask how far, in the mind of our man, it stands connected with these notions, the answer must be, that immediately, and in the mind of the practical man, it is not so connected at all. He is responsible for that which he is, no matter what he is, and no matter how he became so; provided only that the conditions of imputation are present. But what the ordinary man would think is one thing; what he ought to think, if he saw more clearly, is another thing. And if we state the question differently, and ask whether rational prevision is consistent with all that is *implied* in accountability, can coexist with the *conditions* of imputation, a different reply must, I think, be given. We saw that a man was accountable, because he himself, and no other, has acted; and now, so far as I am able to see, the possibility of the explanation of his self means that his self does not exist at all, and therefore, of course, can not act.

Those who agree with the Essayist, that the "explanation (whatever that is) of his self means that his self does not exist at all," will agree with him in this conclusion. Those who do not understand or do not accept this premiss will not agree with the conclusion. And as to the prediction of a man's character and actions, we have found it stated as unobjectionable in the only case where it is possible, viz., by the Omniscience of Deity.

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The Essayist here re-states the question in another form, and proceeds to consider the supposition that, knowing the character of men, and the principles of historical development, and given the knowledge of physical phenomena in the fullest possible sense, the future man or the future stage of social development can be predicted. The Essayist thinks that even with all this material, give you what knowledge of the laws and what existing data you please, neither could be predicted.

You can not calculate the future. You can predict the result, only so far as your experience goes, *i.e.*, so far as you know the result; and as long as history does not repeat itself, and while no two men are ever born the same, so long will the individual result you want be lacking to you.

This is at least obscure. We can only predict results so far as our experience goes, *i.e.*, there is a limitation of our capacity, and a limitation of our knowledge, which precludes prediction.

This is supposed to be further explained by "so far as you know the results;" but surely it is a truism to say that we can

predict only so far as we know. But the grand difficulty of all is the occult and mysterious influence by which, notwithstanding complete knowledge of existing data and of laws, "history does not repeat itself;" and by which "no two men are ever born the same;" from which it is to be inferred that in these phenomena occur breaches in the continuity of sequence, which by the terms of the theory under discussion (Determinism) are excluded, which phenomena are claimed to be predictable by Omniscience. Or else it means that we are thrown back upon the previous supposition of our incapacity to grasp the whole of a set of phenomena likely to affect certain future phenomena, and, in fact, the prediction of phenomena is practically limited by our experience, and is always subject to the proviso of no unforeseen disturbing cause intervening. Absolutely to predict a phenomenon would require the omniscience of the Deity. Can we predict the spots in the sun? Can we say that the appearance of spots in the sun affects the climate of India, and is connected with drought and famine? Can we say that a relief subscription will be commenced, and any particular individual will give to it? Again, starting with the individual, Can we say that a marriage will produce a child? What like this child will be? How circumstances and education will develop him? What he will (causationally) make himself, and how he will therefore be affected by these results of the drought in India? I only go through these sets of phenomena to show the omniscience that is requisite for prediction, and to show that any discussion as to prediction must take for granted omniscience prior to a man's existence.

The whole question lies in a nutshell. *If* the man is made by what answers to your theoretical deduction, *then* you (omniscience?) can deduce him in anticipation; but if he is not, then you can not. And so with society. *If* a stage in history is the result of what corresponds to your (omniscience?) intellectual putting together of conclusions from premises, *then* you (omniscience?) may calculate it; but if it is not, then you can not. *If* the individual self and society are "compositions" of that order that a knowledge of their elements gives you (omniscience?), *apart from experience*, a knowledge of the individuals, *then* you (omniscience?) can "compound" them, and construe them *a priori*; but if they are not, you, (omniscience?) can not.

The question here is changed from a theoretical one (omniscience) into a practical one (you), and the result of the practical



one is put down to the account of the theoretical one, and, being found inadequate, the theoretical one is condemned. For my part, I do not see the use of making such theoretical suppositions. "If" and "If" follow each other till the mind becomes quite bewildered. Why not keep as near as possible to the actualities? And, as a matter of fact, men, not being omniscient, are only able to make probable and partial predictions.

The conclusion of the Essayist is that the common man's opinion of prediction is antagonistic to the Determinist theory; and that theory becomes offensive to him when he is made to thoroughly understand it. My criticism has been to show that the theory is misrepresented, and that the objections the plain man makes to it are illogical, and that he expresses himself in absurd language. The summary of the criticism is better stated thus. For "prediction" should be substituted "a process capable of prediction," as what is objected to by the common man, the objection not being to the prediction but to the process. And if it is the process which is objected to, then a prediction by omniscience is just as objectionable as one by man, for the process, which is the thing that is objected to, remains the same, and implies regular orders of sequences by which man is produced. What is the logical value of this objection by the common man to thus knowing the origin of himself? The plain man is the unreflective man; his opinions the unexamined expression of first impressions; his language the language of ignorance. If we sit at the feet of ignorance what will be the result of our studies? And even if he does use the language put into his mouth by the Essayist, and feel the feelings of horror attributed to him, it is a mere momentary expression of surprise, which will gradually pass away with familiarity; and will he not find, on close investigation, that there is nothing to be horrified at, but that all that he holds most sacred and peculiar to self and will, and so on, remain not only in existence, but also just as sacred as they were before?

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To proceed, the plain man is made to say to the Determinist:—

When you speak to us plainly, you have to say that you really understand a man to be free, and free in no other sense than a falling stone, or than running water. In the one case there is as little necessity as in the other, and just as much freedom. And we believe that this is your meaning. But

we know that, if these things are so, a man has no more of what we call freedom than a candle or a coprolite, and of that you will never succeed in convincing us. You must persuade us either that the coprolite is responsible, or that we are *not* responsible; and, with all due respect to you, we are going to believe neither.

The Determinist does not say that man is no more free than a falling stone or running water; he asserts that man is a living organism to begin with, having its own peculiar vital laws; and, in addition, that he is a being possessed of emotions, and, above all, of intellect and reason. But are reasoning and intellectual processes not in some form governed by Causation? Are there not laws of thought, and laws of all his activities, from amongst which results the feeling of choice, and the feeling of responsibility, the consciousness of will, and of the power of self-regulation?

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The vulgar, again, have a feeling that "a gulf divides them from the material world; they believe their being to lie beyond the sphere of mere physical laws," etc.; but the question is as to laws, and not as to physical laws. Are there not laws of thought, etc., as above?

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The Essayist then goes on to discuss the subject of punishment according to the common view, and in relation to the theory of Necessity, in which, according to the former, punishment is an end in itself, and according to the latter view, it is only a means to an end. To this I would reply, that the view that punishment as an end in itself is quite consistent with the Determinist view as explained in the foregoing Essay, and that it can thoroughly adopt the vulgar opinions and practice.

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The general conclusion of the Essayist is, that neither of the two great bodies of philosophic thought harmonises with the common notions; and my criticism is to the effect that the Causational theory, properly explained, does harmonise with them.

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Before proceeding further, let us refer to the opinion of the vulgar with regard to idiotcy, imbecility, insanity, and dotage, and the agreement or disagreement of this opinion with Determinism



or Non-determinism. It will be found, I think, to coincide with the former. And the conclusion with regard to the responsibility or non-responsibility of these classes follows, and is thus traced back to the common belief in Determinism. And if we carry the enquiry further, and ask what is the opinion of the vulgar with respect to the heredity, not only of physiological characteristics, but of mental and moral characteristics also, the verdict will again be in favour of the Determinist theory.

And to anticipate a little, I will also ask, What is the common opinion with respect to the "willing self" of idiots, imbeciles, insane persons, intoxicated persons, habitual drunkards, infants, dotards, Australian savages, or the savages of our cities, etc. ?

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But it was stated at the beginning of the Essay that the common opinion demands the recognition of two facts as the bases of responsibility, viz., "the willing self," and "the self-same will." The enquiry respecting these is now taken up with the view of ascertaining what is meant by these expressions, and how far they accord with Determinism.

A man, to express what the people believe, is only responsible for what (mediately or immediately) issues from the act of volition; and in that act his will is present, his will being himself, and neither a part of himself nor a certain disposition of elements not in a self, but the whole self expressing itself in a particular way, manifesting itself as will in this or that utterance, and, in and by such manifestation, qualifying the will which manifests itself. The will must be in the act, and the act in the will; and as the will is the self which remains the same self, therefore the act, which was part of the self, is now part of the self, since the self is that which it has done. We say "I will," and we mean something by it. We distinguish "I" and "will." "I" is what we always say, when we speak of thinking or doing at all, and "will" means now some particular act which we will. And again in "I will" we unite "I" and "will," in such a way that the notion of dividing them is absurd; when of each it can be said that the one is in the other, partition is out of the question. "I" was there as a solid individual; then, when a particular act was before it, "I" became to us that which included and was wider than this, that, or the other possible particulars; and lastly, in "I will" there is no particular nor universal part, but an inseparable whole.

If, then, this is a correct description of vulgar opinion is it antagonistic to Determinism? Allowing for the fancifulness of the language,

except in the last clause, which I, through ignorance, do not understand, I do not think it is.

But the Essayist states that Necessarians ignore the self as willing self, and proceeds to make a statement of the Determinist theory. He first objects to the phrase, "the mechanism of the human mind," and, I think, justly. But this phrase, as argued in my Essay, can be repudiated without detriment to the Determinist theory. Mr. Bradley, however, considers it essential to it, for when

Proceeding to inquire into the determination of the will by "motives," we find every term and phrase has a meaning not until we import into the consideration of ourselves the coarsest and crassest mechanical metaphors of pulls and pushes, drawings and thrustings, which we believed to exist not anywhere except in the lowest phenomena of the natural world. . . . So, in reading our determinists, the one chance of their terms bringing anything at all before the intellect, is for us to keep in sight a thing called a will, pushed and pulled by things called motives; or else certain "forces" called motives, acting within a given space called self, and, by their "composition," resulting in no movement at all or a movement called "will;" uncertain whether such movement is a movement of the whole "collection" in the space called self, or a movement only of part of that collection.

Now, I submit that we can understand what is meant by motives, desires, longings, agreeable feelings, and painful feelings, without the introduction of mechanical metaphors to express our meaning. And it seems to me there is less obscurity in the statement of the Determinist theory than in that of any other.

Mr. Bradley professes to regard motives and desires as "objects," and states that, according to the Determinist theory, "the will is a 'thing in a bag,' called self, and is moved by other things out of or in the bag."

This description is refined for further consideration, but, in the meantime, is it not misleading to call things by their wrong names, to liken them to other things which they do not resemble, and then to argue about them in their changed identity? The refined statement of Determinism is this, "That states of mind, called motives, stand to the mind, of which they are the states, as forces stand to the space they meet in." I think this statement is not correct, because I think it overlooks the organic connection of the states of the mind, which does not appear in the latter part of the comparison. The kind of connection I refer to is exhibited in the contrast between the organic and co-ordinative relations of the



activities of a living object, such as a man, and the chaotic relations of the forces meeting together in, say a volcano. There are many cases where the same organ, or part of a man, may be recognised in different states, and these states may affect the states of other parts and activities, and all of them are more or less in relation to the changing condition of the external world. And even this refined statement is a simile. And again, I object to the employment of similes in the discussion of philosophical subjects. They are the more dangerous the more nearly they approach verisimilitude.

The Essayist, dealing with the subject in the gross, does not consider the details of the Determinist theory, and overlooks the reasoning and intellectual faculties as part of the constituents of this mind, which he describes as pushed and pulled about by motives. How this affects the representation and estimation of the Determinist theory I have endeavoured to show in my Essay.

In the application to the theory of the test of vulgar opinion, Mr. Bradley can see "no connection between the theory and the facts we know."

The phrases of one sphere lose all their meaning when applied to the other sphere. That the self in desire should have gone beyond itself, and yet not be beside itself; that the many desires should all be the desires of the self; that the self should be divided against itself in desire; that the self should from all its desires distinguish itself; that it should confront them, and taking some one of them into itself, should free itself so from all other attractions, and spend its whole being in that *one* direction; that the realised desire is the utterance of the self, and that the act which is that utterance should remain in the self, even as the self went out in the act—all and every one of these sayings become senseless, when translated into the language of mechanism, into motives, and tractions, and compositions of forces.

Repudiating the language of mechanism, etc., I think I can fairly accept the description of vulgar opinion here given into an exposition of the Causal theory, allowance being made for a little mysticism of expression.

The Essayist, in speaking of Determinism, seems to have in his mind, if not mere Materialism, then the barest and baldest statements of the theory by which human actions are put down to the tractions and impulses of motives only, not seeming to consider it to contain any account of Reason and Choice, Self-Rule,

and what is called Will. Perhaps the account I have endeavoured to give is a *rapprochement* of the Determinist theory to the Essayist's views.

By "a will that *wills* nothing," which Determinism is said to hold by (p. 33), Mr. Bradley has undoubtedly a meaning, but he does not explain it anywhere to my comprehension. What is the definition of the noun in this case? What is the definition of the verb? It would seem to me to refer to the absence in the noun of activities which are essential to the action denoted by the verb. It seems to me to imply that the Essayist understands the Determinist theory to include in the noun only forces of a particular kind, which, in their operation, result in action certainly, but not that particular kind of action which is called "To Will." This peculiar and essential property, which he is thus supposed to refer to, I can well imagine in a bald statement of Determinism to be supposed to be excluded. This peculiar and essential property of an action, which gives special meaning to the term "To Will," I assert is its property of being Rational; the meaning of the term "rational action" being an action decided upon by the reason after deliberation as to its suitability in the relative adjustment of inner activities and outer environment. This I have endeavoured to explain in my Essay, and, if successfully, then I have shown that the Determinist theory asserts "a will which does will."

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The next belief of the vulgar that we have to consider is the continuance of personal identity. I approach this subject with fear and trembling. The Essayist says, "without personal identity responsibility is sheer nonsense," in which I am disposed to agree with him, "and to the psychology of our Determinist personal identity (with identity in general) is a word without a vestige of meaning," p. 33. The discussion of this subject is, I fear, beyond my capacity, and I am really afraid of venturing upon a question which Hume has settled for ever. Did he do so by means of illustrations, such as marbles in a bag, or bunches of grapes, or strings of onions? What does Mr. Bradley mean by saying that "each of these onions is a state of the rope of onions?" If he means it is a parallel case to the co-relation of human activities in the individual, surely it is a misrepresentation; the stomach, for



instance, is never said to be "a state" of a man, but a part of him; the states of the stomach vary, and this is a proper expression. So all the limbs and organs are parts rather than states. So the mind is part of a man, and it has its states peculiar to itself, and the whole are in constant inter-relation.

I think, even upon the most unfavourable representation of Determinism, *i.e.*, the most mechanical, these are very incorrect and inadequate similes; for each marble in the bag, and each onion and grape, has no active relation with any other; whereas, the "motives" of a man have constant active inter-relations.

The illustration is carried further, and we are asked to imagine that onions are self-conscious, that they talk, and so on;—a conception of which I am incapable, and one which I think cannot but be misleading. The employment of these illustrations is like asking a man who is working and means business to come and play; or, after carefully discriminating phenomena and their orders of sequence, it is a plain request to mix them all up again.

For my part, I do not see what all this has got to do with personal identity. I, as holding the Causational theory, do not see that it is inconsistent with personal identity, and Mr. Bradley has failed to convince me that it is so. The following seems to be the best expression of the difficulty by the Essayist:—

But here, unfortunately, our troubles are not over: this collection is aware of itself; it talks about itself as if it were simple. And this it is impossible to picture at all; and we here (I speak for myself, so far as I have tried) are reduced to despair; for we want to keep the collection steadily before us, and yet, as often as we have to imagine it aware of itself, our picture is at once in confusion, and we do not know what we have before us at all; all we are sure of is that it is *not* a collection, while we know all the time that it really is so.

Is the difficulty due to the use of the word "collection?" I do not think that in a description of the mind I would use the word at all. Thus, we do not even say of the body that it is a collection of limbs and organs; and though we do speak of states, we do not speak of a collection of states. Whatever mind is we only know it by its states, and to speak of those as collections seems to me to be a mistake. Surely personal identity can continue and be consistent with changes of state. At any rate, all that is meant by identity, generally (for the vulgar

